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Norm talk and human cooperation: Can we talk ourselves into cooperation? 
 
Abstract 
Norm talk is verbal communication that explicitly states or implicitly implies a social norm. 
To investigate its ability to shape cultural dynamics, two types of norm talk were examined: 
injunction, which explicitly states what should be done, and gossip, which implies a norm by 
stating an action approved or disapproved of by the communicator. In two experiments, 
participants engaged in norm talk in repeated public goods games. Norm talk was found to 
help sustain cooperation relative to the control condition; immediately after every norm talk 
opportunity, cooperation spiked, followed by a gradual decline. Despite the macro-level 
uniformity in their effects on cooperation, evidence suggests different micro-level 
mechanisms for the cooperation-enhancing effects of injunction and gossip. A third study 
confirmed that both injunction and gossip sustain cooperation by making salient the norm of 
cooperation, but injunction also effects mutual verification of the communicated norm, 
whereas gossip emphasizes its reputational implications by linking cooperation to status 
conferral and noncooperation to reputational damage. A fourth experiment provided 
additional evidence that norm talk was superior to the promise of conditional cooperation in 
sustaining cooperation. Implications of the findings for cultural dynamics are discussed in 
terms of how feelings of shared morality, language-based interpersonal communication, and 
ritualization of norm communication contribute to social regulation.  
 




Norm talk and human cooperation: Can we talk ourselves into cooperation? 
Norms are said to be one of the most, if not the most, cited of all explanations of 
human social behavior in the social sciences (Gibbs, 1968). In social psychology too, the 
concept of norms has gained prominence in recent times (e.g., Gelfand & Jackson, 2016; 
Morris, Hong, Chiu, & Liu, 2015; Zou & Leung, 2015). Of all the variants of the norm 
concept (for an attempt to catalog it, see Gibbs, 1965; also see Anderson & Dunning, 2014), 
the present article is concerned with what Cialdini, Reno, and Kallgren (1990; Cialdini, 
Kallgren, & Reno, 1991) called an injunctive norm – that is, a prescriptive or proscriptive 
norm, or what should or should not be done. From health behavior (e.g., Reid & Aiken, 2013) 
to environmental behavior (e.g., Cialdini et al., 1990; Schultz, Nolan, Cialdini, Goldstein, & 
Griskevicius, 2007) and beyond (e.g., sexual behavior; van de Bongardt, Reitz, Sandfort, & 
Deković, 2015), injunctive norms have been found to influence intentions and behaviors in a 
wide range of social contexts (for a meta-analysis, see Manning, 2009).  
Whereas it is possible for people to adopt these injunctive norms through observation 
or self-reflection, we believe that the socionormative influence often occurs through the 
communication of an injunctive norm, what we call norm talk. We define norm talk as 
utterances (i.e., verbal behaviors) that explicitly state or implicitly imply an injunctive norm 
about what should or should not be done. When someone says “should” or “ought to”, the 
speaker is likely engaged in an explicit form of norm talk, whereas when someone praises or 
condemns a course of action the speaker is likely engaged in an implicit form of norm talk by 
implying an injunctive norm through that (dis)approval. George Homans ([1961] 1974), a 
sociologist of renown, even went as far as defining a norm as a “statement made by a number 
of members of a group….that the members ought to behave in a certain way in certain 
circumstances (p. 46, italics added).” To him, a social norm is norm talk, and presumably, 
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norm talk is the primary means by which injunctive norms are communicated in human 
societies. 
It is an open question whether people’s fleeting norm talk has any socio-cultural 
implications. When one individual engages in norm talk to another individual, does it 
influence the latter’s action? When norm talk circulates within a local social network, does it 
increase the likelihood of norm-consistent action in the network? Cialdini et al.’s (1990, 
1991) focus theory suggests that the answer to these questions should be “yes”. According to 
focus theory, an injunctive norm influences action when it is salient in the actor’s mind. 
Norm talk, by definition, increases the salience of injunctive norms, which means that it 
should influence action. Even though a single instance of norm talk may only have a minute 
effect, if it happens with some regularity its cumulative socio-cultural consequences may be 
far reaching. From a cultural dynamics perspective, everyday interpersonal conversations 
may have significant consequences when they accumulate across many social situations over 
time. For example, interpersonal communications may have cumulative effects on the 
formation, maintenance, and transformation of cultural stereotypes and intergroup 
relationships over time (e.g., Clark & Kashima, 2007; Hunzaker, 2014; Kashima, 2000; 
Lyons & Kashima, 2003; Schaller, Conway, & Tanchuk, 2002; Schaller & Conway, 1999; 
see Kashima, 2013, for a recent review). Indeed, interpersonal communication through social 
networks may be a critical micro-level mechanism that can shape societal outcomes (e.g., 
DiFonzo et al., 2013; DiFonzo et al., 2014; E. R. Smith, 2014).  
If norm talk matters, it is most likely to matter in the provision of public goods (i.e., 
goods that are freely available to everyone, such as public parks, clean air, and stable 
climate). Typically, the provision of these goods involves a social dilemma, where the 
formation and maintenance of collective goods crucially depends on individuals’ cooperation, 
but there is a strong incentive for the individuals to free ride (for reviews, see Dawes, 1980; 
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Kollock, 1998; Komorita & Parks, 1995; Parks, Joireman, & van Lange, 2013; Van Lange, 
Joireman, Parks, & Van Dijk, 2013). If interpersonal norm talk about cooperation – an 
individual talking about an injunctive norm of cooperation to another individual in their 
social network – discourages free riding, then this may be one micro-level process by which 
humans can overcome the social dilemma at the heart of public goods provision. Because 
language-based communication is a uniquely human psychological tool (e.g., Holtgraves & 
Kashima, 2008), which may socially regulate collective action (E. A. Smith, 2010), we 
investigated whether such a uniquely human communicative regulation of collective action is 
possible in public goods game experiments.  
Norm Talk in Social Dilemmas 
A social dilemma situation is prototypically modeled by a public goods game, where 
everyone is better off if everyone contributes to the provision of public goods than if no one 
does; however, individuals are always better off when they free ride than when they 
cooperate (e.g., Chaudhuri, 2010; Ledyard, 1995). In these situations, where a Homo 
economicus – what Nobel laureate Eleanor Ostrom (2000) called a rational egoist – would 
never cooperate, an injunctive norm of cooperation appears to be a critical factor in the 
maintenance of human cooperation (e.g., Biel & Thøgersen, 2007; Chudek & Henrich, 2011; 
Fehr & Fischbacher, 2004a). Behavioral game theoretic research has shown that people often 
do cooperate in one shot public goods experiments (for reviews, see Chaudhuri, 2010; 
Ledyard, 1995), and when someone fails to do so, people are willing to incur a cost to 
themselves to sanction the free rider (e.g., Fehr & Fischbacher, 2004b; Fehr & Gachter, 
2002). Given that injunctive normativity drives the sanctioning of norm violations (Brauer & 
Chaurand, 2010), it is reasonable to suggest that the injunctive norm of cooperation is shared 
among those who punish free riders in public goods experiments (for a relational explanation 
of norm enforcement see Horne, 2001).   
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 Evidence that norm talk, specifically, may matter comes from studies on group 
discussion in public goods games. When a group of individuals repeatedly engage in a public 
goods game for a finite number of times, the level of cooperation typically declines over time 
(Ledyard, 1995). However, one of the factors that can slow or even stop this decline is a 
group discussion (e.g., Isaac & Walker, 1988; Ledyard, 1995; Ostrom, 2000), and there is 
some suggestive evidence that norm talk in the group discussion may be partly responsible 
for sustaining this cooperation. First, it is well established that when all members of a group 
participate in a discussion the very act of discussing the dilemma situation can increase 
cooperation relative to the control condition in which no communication takes place (e.g., 
Dawes, McTavish, & Shaklee, 1977; Kerr & Kaufmann-Gilliarnd, 1994; Orbell, van de 
Kragt, & Dawes, 1988). Whether communication occurs face-to-face or online (e.g., Jensen, 
Farnham, Drucker, & Kollock, 1999), via open communication or pre-set messages (e.g., 
Chen, 1996; Chen & Komorita, 1994), meta-analyses have consistently found a robust effect 
of communication on cooperation (Balliet, 2009; Sally, 1995). E. A. Smith (2010) noted that 
language appears to enable humans to resolve social dilemmas more easily than other species. 
 Second, a number of researchers have made informal observations about the strongly 
normative undertone of the experimental participants’ discussions in social dilemma 
experiments (e.g., Cason & Khan, 1999; Dawes et al., 1977). In a more systematic 
exploration, Bonacich (1972, 1976) reported the words most frequently used in these 
discussions included normatively evaluative terms like “cheat,” “greed,” “honest” or 
“dishonest”. The content of these face-to-face discussions appears so normative in the 
injunctive sense that Bicchieri and Lev-On (2007, p. 163) summarized it this way: 
“Discussants emphasize not only the mutual gains obtained from cooperation, but also its 
appropriateness and normative appeal.” Whether this normative undertone can be 
decomposed into more specific norms such as norms of commitment or equity, as Kerr 
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(1995) argued, it seems likely that there exists the normative talk of cooperation, that is, “We 
should cooperate in social dilemmas” (for examples of normative written messages, see 
Baum, Paciotti, Richerson, Lubell, & McElreath, 2012) or “You should not take advantage of 
your team members by shirking” (Fehr & Fischbacher, 2004a, p. 185). 
 Whereas this suggests that norm talk accompanies sustained cooperation, it does not 
necessarily mean that interpersonal norm talk itself produces cooperation. First, in explaining 
the benefits of communication, theorists have proposed a number of different mechanisms. 
Although many theorists have argued that communication affects cooperation because of 
social norms (e.g., Bicchieri, 2002; Kerr, 1995), the details of the arguments vary. For 
example, Kerr and Kaufmann-Gilliarnd (1994) have argued that people often make a public 
pledge to cooperate in such group discussions, and it is the norm of commitment and 
consistency – i.e., “now that I’ve said I’d cooperate, I should cooperate” – that drives 
cooperation (also see Kerr, Garst, Lewandowski, & Harris, 1997). In a related vein, Bicchieri 
(2002) suggested that making a pledge to cooperate is backed up by the norm of promise 
keeping, which supports cooperation. In contrast, Bouas and Komorita (1996) argued that this 
norm-cooperation relationship is mediated by perceived consensus to cooperate, rather than 
commitment. As Bicchieri (2002) noted, perceived consensus is not inconsistent with the 
norm argument, and in fact may serve to strengthen the normative effect. Indeed, Kusumi, 
Hirayama, and Kashima (2017) found that perceived consensus strengthened the effect of a 
perceived norm on people’s behavioral intention. 
There is also a perspective that argues that social identification may be the 
psychological process that mediates the effect of communication on cooperation (e.g., Orbell 
et al., 1988). However, there are empirical findings that are somewhat difficult to explain 
from the identification perspective. For instance, Kerr and Kaufmann-Gilliarnd (1994) argued 
that if the discussion effect is due to group identification, group discussion should increase 
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the value of the collective outcome (i.e., the more the group gains as a whole, the more 
valuable), and that this effect should be stronger if an individual is more efficacious in 
producing the collectively beneficial outcome. Their experimental results were opposite to 
this prediction. The effect of group discussion was stronger when an individual was less 
efficacious in producing the collectively beneficial outcome. In another instance, Bouas and 
Komorita (1996) had two conditions in which university students had a discussion prior to 
playing a social dilemma game; in one condition, they discussed the game, but in the other 
condition, they discussed the possibility of their university’s tuition hike. In both conditions, 
the participants had similar levels of group identification; however, the discuss-dilemma 
condition had a far higher level of cooperation than the discuss-tuition condition. 
Furthermore, in both Kerr and Kaufman-Gilliland (1994) and Bouas and Kororita (1996), 
measured group identification could not account for the group discussion effect on 
cooperation (see Bicchieri, 2002, for further detailed discussion). Nonetheless, it is important 
to note that this alternative explanation for the discussion effect on cooperation exists. 
 The critical reason that the existing evidence cannot speak to the role of interpersonal 
norm talk in cooperation is that much of the evidence about communication effects on 
cooperation comes from group discussion, in which all members of the group communicate 
with each other before or during the social dilemma experiment. In many real life situations, 
however, communications do not occur simultaneously within a group as a whole, but occur 
only piecemeal, interpersonally between individual members suspended in social networks. 
The experiment by Kinukawa, Saijo, and Une (2000) suggests that interpersonal 
communications have weaker effects on cooperation than group communications, and in fact, 
when the interpersonal communication was limited to two individuals, it had no effect on 
cooperation. They structured the communication network within a six-person group to create 
four different conditions: a no communication control, a condition in which each member 
8 
 
could interpersonally communicate only with one other member, a condition in which each 
member could interpersonally communicate with two other members, and a condition in 
which all members communicated with each other as a group. The level of cooperation 
increased as the number of communication partners increased, with the group discussion 
condition producing the highest level of cooperation. It is important to note that the condition 
in which a group member had a discussion with only one other partner was no better than the 
no communication control; furthermore, this communication occurred face to face, and there 
is no guarantee that this discussion involved norm talk.  
 Summary. All in all, the literature is inconclusive about the causal efficacy of 
interpersonal norm talk in affecting cooperation in repeated public goods games. Although 
there is evidence that norm talk and cooperation co-occur, there is a variety of interpretations 
of this empirical finding. After all, norm talk is “cheap” in that there is often no binding 
obligation for the speaker or recipients to abide by the espoused norm with little or no 
material cost to those who violate the stated norm. If there is no incentive to cooperate when 
someone suggests it, either the speaker or the recipient may choose to not cooperate. In 
addition, there is no direct evidence that links norm talk to cooperation. That group 
discussions enhance cooperation, and that group discussions often contain norm talk do not 
guarantee that the instance of a norm talk increases cooperation. In fact, the existing studies 
have not shown a direct correlation between the occurrence of norm talk and cooperation. 
Finally, it is an open question whether interpersonal, as opposed to group, norm talk can 
facilitate cooperation at all. In the present studies, we investigate whether interpersonal norm 
talk within a structured social network can sustain cooperation in a repeated public goods 
game. 
Norm Talk as a Speech Act 
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In addition to the first research question of whether norm talk sustains cooperation, 
we investigate the micro-level dynamics of how norm talk may be able to do so. In particular, 
norm talk can take at least two different forms, which have different implications for 
subsequent cultural dynamics. One is an explicit form, that is, an injunction about what 
should or should not be done. If someone says, “We should cooperate”, it explicitly 
communicates an injunctive norm of cooperation, and is explicitly about the action that the 
utterance refers to. This type of statement can be considered to be a speech act (e.g., 
Holtgraves, 2002; Levinson, 1983). In Searle’s (1969) typology, it may be regarded as a 
directive because it directs the recipient of the message to perform a certain action, in this 
case, cooperation. Secondarily, it also directs the speaker him or herself to perform the same 
action because the subject of this utterance, “We”, refers at a minimum to the sender of the 
statement as well as its receiver. In this sense, explicit norm talk of cooperation may be 
regarded primarily as a directive, and secondarily, as a pledge, to cooperate.  
 The other type of norm talk is implicit. It is a statement that implies that people should 
cooperate without saying so explicitly. In particular, gossip is one of the most prominent 
forms of implicit norm talk. Gossip is defined broadly as a communication of reputational 
information about an absent other (e.g., Baumeister, Zhang, & Vohs, 2004; Dunbar, 2004; 
Foster, 2004; Sommerfeld, Krambeck, Semmann, & Milinski, 2007). Therefore it can easily 
occur as a part of the interpersonal communication within a small group, because other group 
members are absent from the communication, but reputational information about them is 
generally known and relevant. Gossip typically involves a triadic relationship among the 
sender, the receiver, and the target of gossip (e.g., Peters & Kashima, 2007, 2015), and in 
communicating positive (negative) gossip to the receiver, the sender can convey approval (or, 
of course, disapproval) of the target or the target’s behavior.  
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In the context of social dilemma, if someone sends a message to another saying that a 
target person has defected, it is gossip. While such gossip need not necessarily indicate the 
sender’s approval or disapproval of the target’s action, it frequently does. Approval can be 
conveyed directly (e.g., “He did not contribute and I disapprove”), indirectly through labels 
and valenced language (e.g., “He is a free rider”) (Torsvik, Molander, Tjøtta, & Kobbeltvedt, 
2011), or indirectly through nonverbal or contextual factors (e.g., a display of 
disappointment). When gossip directly or indirectly signifies approval of a target’s behavior, 
it can be seen as an implicit form of norm talk that communicates the injunctive norm that 
one should cooperate, very much in line with the argument that gossip conveys cultural 
norms (e.g., Baumeister et al., 2004; Gluckman, 1963). Whatever the gossiper’s intent, the 
recipient of the gossip may learn or infer the gossiper’s attitude towards the target’s behavior 
(i.e., approval or disapproval); therefore, the primary information conveyed is reputational. 
However, the gossiper’s inferred attitude may then be generalized to the group to infer the 
injunctive norm held in the group (see Table 1 for a schematic contrast). 
 












Injunction Explicit Norm  Pledge High Low High 
Gossip Implicit Reputation Norm Low High Low 
 
Thus, the two forms of norm talk, injunction and gossip, reflect two aspects of 
Cialdini et al.’s (1990) injunctive norm. Specifically, they have characterized injunctive 
norms as having “the ought meaning of social norms (p. 1015; italics in the original)” and 
also as referring to “rules or beliefs as to what constitutes morally approved and disapproved 
conduct (p. 1015; italics added).” Injunction explicitly conveys the ought meaning, whereas 
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gossip can explicitly convey approval and disapproval, and in so doing, imply the underlying 
norm. 
Social psychological functions of injunction and gossip. If we are correct in 
conceptualizing injunction and gossip as norm talk, then they should have one social 
psychological function in common. Both injunction and gossip should make the injunctive 
norm salient in the sender’s and receiver’s minds. As Cialdini et al.’s (1990, 1991) focus 
theory suggests, norms influence social action when they are salient and cognitively 
accessible to the actors. Cialdini et al. (1990; Study 1) provided empirical support. Observing 
a confederate littering in an otherwise clean parking lot made the injunctive norm of non-
littering salient, and therefore a large majority did not litter (only 6% did); however, the 
likelihood of littering was greater (14%) when people did not observe a littering confederate 
(i.e., norm was not salient). Likewise, by making the injunctive norm of cooperation salient, 
norm talk can encourage the actors to cooperate in social dilemmas. To be sure, a norm 
salience effect may not be long lasting if it is akin to conceptual priming effects. 
Nevertheless, the momentary salience of the norm of cooperation, activated by norm talk, 
may momentarily affect cooperation in social dilemma situations. When these effects are 
repeated over time, norm talk may have a significant cumulative effect. 
The common normative impact of injunction and gossip notwithstanding, the 
distinction between the two is also important because they have potentially different social 
psychological functions. First, injunction and gossip may differ in their capacity to make the 
underlying norm salient (Table 1). Injunction explicitly states the norm, and hence activates 
the norm in both the sender and receiver of that norm talk. In contrast, gossip may not make 
the injunctive norm as salient as injunction. Therefore, the norm salience effect of injunction 
may be stronger than that of gossip.  
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Second, gossip differs from injunction in that gossip contains reputational information 
whereas injunction does not. Thus, gossip can enhance or damage the target person’s 
reputation, but injunction does not have this consequence directly. To the extent that good 
reputation can confer status (e.g., Willer, 2009) and foster further cooperation from others 
(e.g., Barclay, 2004; Wedekind & Milinski, 2000), reputational information can act as reward 
or punishment. In this sense, gossip can provide what French and Raven (1959) called 
coercive or reward power. Consistent with this reasoning, gossip has been found to foster 
cooperation in economic bargaining games (e.g., Beersma & Van Kleef, 2011; Feinberg, 
Willer, Stellar, & Keltner, 2012; Piazza & Bering, 2008; Sommerfeld et al., 2007) and a 
public goods game in particular (Feinberg, Willer, & Schultz, 2014; we will return to this 
point later). Simply engaging in gossip makes one privy to examples of sanctioning and 
status conferral, first making salient the entire reputational system, and consequently one’s 
own reputation (Table 1).  
Whereas injunctions and gossip are both “cheap talk” in economics’ parlance – that is 
they are typically non-binding – they differ in the enforceability of the reputational costs. 
Injunction incurs no direct cost to one’s reputation if its recipient defies the injunction, but 
defying the injunctive norm implied by gossip means one will receive similar sanctions as the 
gossip target has received. Depending on the type of sanctions available, this may involve 
ostracism (e.g., Feinberg et al, 2014), other forms of punishment (e.g., non-cooperation 
afterwards), or simply a negative verbal evaluation. If gossip involves a negative evaluation, 
the target is devalued in the gossiper’s and the gossip recipient’s minds, and imagining that 
one is devalued in someone’s mind may be an enough punishment even in the absence of a 
tangible negative sanction. 
Finally, injunction and gossip differ in the extent to which the response made by the 
receiver has an implication for the normative status of the injunctive norm. Norm talk 
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typically occurs in interpersonal interactions. The receiver of norm talk can verify the 
normative status of the injunctive norm by agreeing with the sender, or the receiver can 
disagree with the sender, thus undermining its normative status. However, this is more likely 
for injunction. When the sender sends an injunction message, the receiver has a chance to 
accept it or not accept it. If it is accepted, the sender and receiver intersubjectively verify the 
injunctive norm. In so doing, they form a shared reality (e.g., Echterhoff, Higgins, & Levine, 
2009; Hardin & Higgins, 1996; Higgins, 1992), and establish an intersubjective culture (Chiu, 
Gelfand, Yamagishi, Shteynberg, & Wan, 2010). If an injunction is not accepted by the 
receiver, the non-acceptance implies that the receiver is less likely to follow the norm than 
otherwise, thus undermining its normative status. In contrast, if gossip is or is not accepted, it 
is primarily the reputational information that is accepted or not accepted directly, but not the 
norm per se. Like the gossip itself, gossip’s acceptance or rejection can infer an injunctive 
norm, but does not explicitly declare one. Consequently, injunction and gossip may differ in 
what may be called norm verifiability (Table 1). The injunctive norm is intersubjectively 
verifiable if it is conveyed by injunction, but less so if it is conveyed by gossip. Figure 1 
















Figure 1. Injunction and gossip have different patterns of norm verifiability. 
 
Summary. Explicit and implicit forms of norm talk, injunction and gossip, are both 
speech acts – producing social consequences by saying something. They both communicate 
and make salient an injunctive norm, but injunction does so explicitly, whereas gossip, when 
explicitly communicating the approval or disapproval of a conduct, implies the norm 
underlying this normative judgment. Both injunction and gossip should maintain cooperation 
in social dilemmas by activating the injunctive norm in the communicators’ minds, but 
potentially through different processes. Injunction may do so by activating the injunctive 
norm of cooperation, whereas gossip may do so by activating the norm to a lesser extent, but 
making salient reputational sanctions. Finally, injunction and gossip have different 
implications in intersubjective verifiability of the status of the injunctive norm qua moral 
norm. The norm of cooperation can be mutually verified when injunction is accepted, but 
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gossip is less amenable to mutual verification – whether a gossip message is accepted or not 
does not directly speak to the normative status of the norm of cooperation. Thus, if norm talk 
sustains cooperation in social dilemmas, injunction and gossip can present two 
communicative mechanisms by which this occurs. 
Present Studies 
This paper summarizes the results of four experiments. Experiments 1 and 2 
investigated the capacity of norm talk to sustain cooperation in public goods games; 
Experiments 3 and 4 investigated the intersubjective mechanisms through which different 
forms of norm talk have their effects. In Experiments 1, 2 and 4, participants took part in a 
repeated public goods game in four-person groups. Experiment 3 presented participants with 
scenarios based on this set up. The game was run online using purpose-built software that 
provided participants with an accurate summary of their own behavior as well as the 
aggregate behavior of their group (in the gossip conditions, participants were also presented 
with a summary of the behavior of a specific group member in communication rounds; e.g., 
“Person B contributed 1 token in the last 5 turns”). The experimental manipulation varied 
participants’ ability to engage in norm talk. Participants in the control condition were not able 
to communicate with one another. In contrast, participants in the norm talk conditions were 
able to exchange norm talk with another specific player after every five rounds. Participants 
selected their norm talk from a menu of statements that could include injunctions (e.g., “We 
should each contribute a lot to the group”), gossip messages (e.g., “Person B contributed very 
little and I disapprove”) or both as a function of study and condition. Participants responded 
to the norm talk that was sent to them by selecting from another menu of statements (e.g., “I 
strongly agree with you”). This paradigm has elements in common with previous work 
(notably that examining the functions of gossip; see Feinberg et al., 2014; Sommerfeld et al., 
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2007, and Ahn, Esarey & Scholz, 2009); we examine these commonalities as well as the 
unique features of the present experimental paradigm in the General Discussion.   
The present studies were designed to answer four main questions. First, we tested the 
hypothesis that mere interpersonal norm talk – injunction and gossip – is sufficient to sustain 
cooperation in repeated public goods games. Both injunction and gossip would make the 
injunctive norm salient, which then should increase cooperation at the time of norm talk. 
Second, we examined the possibility that the different types of norm talk sustain cooperation 
through somewhat different micro-level mechanisms. In particular, we surmised that norm 
talk receivers’ responses have a more important role in verifying the norm for injunction than 
for gossip. Injunctions sent to receivers would increase their cooperation especially when 
they accept the injunctions because it signals the sender’s and the receiver’s mutual 
verification of the status of the injunctive norm qua norm. In contrast, gossip sent to receivers 
should increase their cooperation regardless of their acceptance. This is because gossip 
enforces its normative implication with the reputational threat or reward that it carries. Third, 
we also explored whether the sending of injunction or gossip would predict the sender’s 
cooperation. This should enable us to examine what senders mean when they engage in norm 
talk. If norm talk predicts the sender’s cooperation, it can be interpreted as a pledge to 
cooperate; if it does not, its intended meaning is less clear. Fourth, we directly examined the 
intended meaning of norm talk and replies from the perspective of the sender, receiver, and a 
third-party observer to uncover the mechanisms involved. Norm talk could be primarily 
interpreted as a pledge, or norm talk with reply could be primarily interpreted as mutual 
agreement to cooperate. However, we argue and then demonstrate that norm talk primarily 
increases the salience of the injunctive norm and only secondarily signals a pledge or mutual 




Experiment 1 used the setup in Shank, Kashima, Saber, Gale, and Kirley (2015) to 
examine the effect of norm talk on cooperation in a repeated public goods game. Participants 
in the norm talk conditions were allowed to send a message containing an injunction, gossip, 
or both to another member of the group; if a message was sent, the receiver was given a 
chance to respond, by accepting or rejecting it. In the control conditions, no communication 
was allowed. The norm talk factor was crossed with a benefit factor in which the size of a 
public goods payoff was set at high or low levels, so as to explore whether the effectiveness 
of norm talk differs as a function of the public goods benefit. 
Method 
 Participants. Recruited through Amazon Mechanical Turk, participants residing in 
the USA with records of reliable study participation participated in the experiment on their 
own devices. They were told that study sessions occurred once per hour and were directed to 
a webpage running custom software. For the ten minutes prior to each hour they were 
allowed to login and proceeded through pages including a study information page, a consent 
form, instructions on the primary decision-making task (the public goods task), a quiz about 
those instructions, instructions on message-sending rounds, and finally a virtual waiting room 
where participants were told to wait until an experiment began. Participants that reached the 
waiting room remained until the top of the hour, when the software automatically began 
forming groups of four out of participants in the waiting room, delegating excess participants 
to smaller groups not used in this study. They then participated in 31 rounds of public goods 
dilemma decisions interspersed with six communication rounds in the norm talk conditions. 
The number of public goods or communication rounds was not told to participants in 
advance. After this, participants filled out demographic and other questionnaires and were 
provided a code to submit their completion on Mechanical Turk. Participants were paid a 
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base rate of 2.50 USD, plus a bonus based on the cumulative points earned from the public 
goods dilemma. An entire session typically lasted from 20 to 40 minutes.  
Because our experimental manipulations and analysis occurs at the level of the group, 
we conducted a power analysis on the required group sample size (Snijders, 2005). To obtain 
power = .80 for a within-factor repeated-measure design with six key measurements (the six 
cooperation rounds following norm talk) with a medium-strong effect size (d = .65).. The 
power analysis indicated 8 groups were required per condition, but due to our varied 
analyses,  we conservatively predetermined to collect a minimum of 12 complete sessions per 
condition. The experimental platform was designed to pool all potential participants signed 
up in an online “waiting room,” to randomly construct as many groups of specified size (4 in 
the present case) as possible at a time, and start the experimental procedure. Anyone who has 
waited longer than five minutes was given a chance to participate in a different experiment, 
left the present study, and therefore could not be included in the study. In addition, due to the 
nature of the interactive group, participants who miss three decisions (i.e., a majority of a 
block of five decisions; see below for details about missing a decision) were deemed 
unreliable, and were also surmised that they may bias the group processes. For these reasons, 
we set the program to drop these participants while the rest of the group continue to play the 
public goods game; however, we predetermined that these data should be treated as 
incomplete and therefore should not be included in our data. Because of the possibility of 
incomplete sessions, we conducted more sessions than were needed, meaning we slightly 
exceeded our minimum session numbers. When a target was reached, all complete data were 
kept and analysed; no further data collection took place thereafter. The final sample consisted 
of 212 participants in 53 four-person groups. 
Procedure. Participants were given the identical instructions prior to reaching the 
virtual waiting room, and then were pseudorandomly assigned, by arrival order, to the 
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experimental conditions when the software formed groups from the participants in the 
waiting room. The instructions indicated that everyone in one’s group had to decide whether 
to contribute a renewed endowment (100 points) to the group (cooperate) or keep it for 
oneself (defect) each round. All members’ contributions to the group were then summed and 
multiplied by a parameter called the MPCR (marginal per capita return) to determine the 
number of points each player individually received in that round from the group. Therefore, if 
a player kept the endowment, he or she obtained the sum of the endowment and the return 
from all the members’ contributions. In contrast, a player who contributed the endowment 
received only the return from all the members’ contributions. On every dilemma round all of 
the possible outcomes were presented in a table. Based on pilot tests, we set the level of 
MPCR to .3 (low benefit) and .4 (high benefit). After the instructions, participants had to 
correctly answer a four-question quiz about contribution decisions using an example table 
before proceeding.  
The instructions also contained information about how participants may be able to 
send and receive messages during the experiment (see below for further details), so that 
everyone was familiar with the messages that they may be able to send and receive, and the 
interface (drop-down boxes) that they may use, regardless of whether they were in the norm 
talk conditions or not. However, they were explicitly told that in some conditions they would 
be asked to use this functionality, whereas in other conditions, they would not. This was 
necessary to keep the salience of injunction and gossip constant in all conditions, so that we 
can gauge the impact of actual norm talk, not just the potential of it, on cooperation. 
Once they were assigned to a group in a condition, participants began to play a public 
goods game, and for each round, they were shown the table of possible outcomes given their 
and others’ decisions. There was also a timer, set to 1 minute in the first rounds and 30 
seconds in all other rounds in which they had to make their decision to keep or contribute. 
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When everyone in a group had made their decisions or time had run out, the program 
advanced to the next screen. Regardless of whether the next screen was a public goods or 
communication round, it would display the results from the previous public goods round in 
terms of the number of contributors, the participant’s decision, the points they had earned, 
and their updated cumulative point total. Note that no information about any other individual 
player’s decision was given. There were altogether 31 rounds of the public goods game. 
 The timers on each round ensured that individuals who did not make a selection 
would not hold up the entire group. When the time expired, the software advanced to the next 
screen. Because of the interactive nature of the public goods dilemma and communications, 
participants who missed public good decisions were treated as choosing to cooperate, and 
missed messages and replies were treated as choosing not to communicate in terms of their 
effect on the participants and in terms of analysis. If any participant in a session missed three 
decisions, that participant was dropped by the software and that session was incomplete and 
not included in the dataset. The missed decisions in complete sessions therefore were a 
maximum of two per participant, and were only excluded from analysis when they were the 
dependent variable.  
Norm talk. In the norm talk conditions, six communication rounds occurred, placed 
after every five public goods rounds. Each communication round consisted of a message and 
reply stage, presented on two separate screens. For the message stage, participants were given 
information about one group member’s contribution over the past five rounds and allowed to 
send a message to another participant. For the reply stage, participants then received a 
message from another group member and they were allowed to reply. Replies were then 
displayed prior to the beginning of the next public goods game round. All communication 
rounds had 30 second timers. 
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 Because the study involved 31 public goods rounds, sixth and final communication 
round was presented between rounds 30 and 31, enabling us to examine the effect of norm 
talk on the final dilemma round. On each of the six communication rounds, every participant 
took the role of a sender, receiver, and target. For a particular message, the sender, receiver, 
and target were always different people. See Figure 2 for a schematic representation of these 
roles. For example, on one round, A would communicate to B about C, B would 
communicate to C about D, C would communicate to D about A, and D would communicate 
to A about B. These were structured so that they always formed an inclusive ring, meaning 
that there was never reciprocal communication in the same round (e.g., A communicating to 
B while B communicated to A). Over the course of the six communication rounds, these 
inclusive rings ensured that each sender had every receiver by target combination exactly 
once. From A’s perspective, A communicate about B once to C and once to D, about C once 
to B and once to D, and about D once to B and once to C, and received messages that were 
similarly distributed (see Supplementary Table S1 for distribution pattern; supplementary 
information is provided to allow for exact replication of these methods and for details of 
specific outcomes). Senders and receivers knew who they were sending and receiving from 
and the sender initially knew who the target was and could communicate that to the receiver. 
Participants were only identified by the letters A, B, C, and D.  
 
Figure 2. A Schematic Presentation of the Norm Talk Structure 
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Note. S = Sender; R = Receiver; T = Target. S has information about T, and sends a message 
to R; R replies to S. 
Norm talk components. Participants were allowed to communicate a range of preset 
messages from dropdown menus that combined two message components (Table S2). The 
first was a gossip component (shown with B as the target as an example). We gave 
participants two different types of messages they could send. One described the target’s 
behavior, and the other, the target’s disposition and only one of those two types could be 
selected. A behavioral message could be selected from five options with varying degrees of 
prosociality, from “Person B contributed very little” to “Person B contributed very much”. 
Similarly, a dispositional message could be selected from five options from “B is a very 
unhelpful person” to “B is a very helpful person”. The gossip component included a 
supplementary gossip approval component with five options from “I strongly disapprove” to 
“I strongly approve”. This supplementary component was only enabled when a gossip 
message was selected. Both the gossip message and gossip approval components could vary 
and only their alignment produces the sort of norm talk that conveys explicit reputational 
information with an implicit norm. Therefore, approving of prosocial behavior and 
disapproving of self-interested behavior were both coded 1, with all other combinations of the 
gossip message and gossip approval (e.g., approving of selfish behavior, not approving nor 
disapproving, not sending gossip) were coded as 0 (See Table S3 for more details).  
The second was an injunction component, which could be selected independently 
from the gossip component (i.e., they were separate drop-down boxes). Again, we gave 
participants two types of message options: a more concrete and more abstract injunction 
(Table S2). They could select only one type. The five concrete injunctions varied from “We 
should keep a lot for ourselves” to “We should contribute a lot to the group”, and the five 
abstract injunctions varied from “We should focus completely on being individuals” to “We 
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should focus completely on being one group”. These were coded from -2 to +2, with larger 
numbers represented more prosociality (Table S4). All of the components that a given sender 
selected (i.e., gossip – with or without approval – or injunction, or both) were joined together 
and sent to the receiver. When a sender failed to choose either gossip or injunction 
components, the receiver was informed that the sender had not sent a message. 
 If a message was sent, the receiver had an opportunity to reply. Based on pilot testing, 
we included five agreement messages from “I strongly disagree with you” to “I strongly 
agree with you”, and three evaluative messages: “That is terrible”, “Okay”, and “That is 
excellent” (Table S6). Intermediate evaluative messages were considered, but pilot testing 
revealed they were rarely used and so we did not include them in the study proper. If the 
receiver chose not to reply, the sender was informed of this. All replies were coded from -2 to 
+2, with higher values indicating a more positive agreement or evaluation (Table S6). No 
other manipulations or measures were present in this study. 
Results 
A total of 212 participants in 53 usable groups were collected with at least 12 usable 
groups per condition. Participants only failed to make a public goods decision on 28 of the 
6572 (0.4%) trials and these were reasonably evenly distributed among conditions (Table S7).  
Norm talk sustains cooperation over time. Figure 3 presents the mean levels of 
cooperation over time in all conditions. In the control conditions, there are clear trends of 
declining cooperation over time, whereas in the norm talk conditions, there is a cyclical 
pattern in which the cooperation level “spikes” after every norm talk, which occurred after 





Figure 3: Mean cooperation levels in Experiment 1. 
 
To determine if norm talk helps sustain cooperation over time, we fit a Mixed Model 
Logistic Regression model to cooperation decisions. The predictors were the experimental 
variables, Norm Talk (norm talk vs. control), Benefit (high vs. low), Time (linear and 
quadratic trends), and their relevant interactions (Table 2). Note that individuals are nested 
under their group, and time is a repeated measures factor. There is a significant decline in 
cooperation over time as indicated by a negative linear trend of time, but the rate of decrease 
slows as indicated by the positive quadratic trend of time. The interaction effect of norm talk 
with time reveals that norm talk increases cooperation over time (Coef = .045, p < .001) and 
high benefit has a marginal positive effect on cooperation over time (Coef = .020, p < .1). 
Consistent with our expectations, norm talk can maintain cooperation over time. 




























Intercept -.303 .739 
Benefit .845 2.329 
Norm Talk -.406 .666 
Time -.137*** .872 
Time2 .002*** 1.002 
   
Benefit X Norm Talk 1.050 2.858 
   
Benefit X Time .020† 1.020 
Norm Talk X Time .045*** 1.046 
Benefit X Norm Talk X 
Time 
-.022 .978 
   
Group Intercept  2.822  
   
% Correctly Predicted 78.1  
N 6544  
Note: *** p < .001; ** p < .01; * p < .05; † p < .1. 
 
We noted the spiking pattern of cooperation in the norm talk conditions. Each time it 
occurs, a sudden jump is followed by a gradual decline until the next norm talk occurrence, 
where a sudden jump occurs again. To investigate this pattern statistically, we conducted two 
sets of follow-up analyses. First, we compared the levels of cooperation immediately before 
and immediately after each norm talk round. There was a statistically significant increase in 
cooperation in both the low, from .18 to .28, t(669) = 2.874, p =.004, and high conditions, 
from .45 to .60, t(621)=3.848, p ≤ .001. Second, we fit a set of Mixed Model Logistic 
Regression model with dummy variables representing the five rounds (immediately after 
norm talk, two rounds after norm talk, etc.; five rounds after norm talk was the reference). 
Again, individuals were nested under groups. Table 3 indicates that the increased cooperation 
is maintained the first three turns after norm talk, relative to the reference point of the fifth 
round after norm talk.  
The analyses verify the spiking pattern we noted. Next, we examine the micro-level 
dynamics that produce this spike in an effort to understand how norm talk may boost the level 




Table 3: General Linear Mixed Model Logistic Regression predicting cooperation in the 





   
Intercept -.952 .386 
Benefit 1.532† 4.625 
Time -.074* .929 
Time2 .001 1.001 
   
Benefit X Time .018 1.018 
   
Round After Norm Talk a   
  +1  .792*** 2.207 
  +2  .599*** 1.821 
  +3  .332* 1.393 
  +4  .212 1.236 
   
Group Intercept  4.904  
   
Percent Correctly Predicted 80.6  
N 2806  
Note: *** p < .001; ** p < .01; * p < .05; † p < .1. a +5 rounds after norm talk is the reference  
 
Norm talk: What does it communicate and what are the consequences? 
Participants in the norm talk conditions sent messages a majority of the time (513/648; 
79.2%). When they sent messages, they almost always used both injunction and gossip (490; 
95.5%); When a message was sent, the receiver almost always replied (474; 92.4%). When a 
gossip message was sent, people also included the approval-disapproval component 
(482/512; 94.1%), resulting in 314 (61.2%) of the total messages being coded as prosocial 
gossip (i.e., approving of cooperation and disapproving of defection). See Supplementary 
Information (Table S8) for a detailed breakdown of the message content.  
Truth, gossip, injunction, and replies. The gossip message was overwhelmingly 
truthful with a .89 correlation (p ≤ .001) between the valence of the sender’s gossip message 
and the target’s cooperation level that was presented to the sender (also see Sommerfeld et 
al., 2007). When both gossip and injunctive messages were sent, the prosociality of the gossip 
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(1 versus 0) correlated with the injunction at r=.55 (p ≤ .001), suggesting that, although 
correlated, gossip and injunction are not always consistent. Specifically, the most extreme 
prosocial injunctions (i.e., those coded +2) were frequently accompanied by prosocial gossip 
(205/235; 87.2%) and the extremely self-interested injunctions were infrequently 
accompanied by prosocial gossip (20/96; 20.8%), yet the less extreme and neutral injunctions 
(i.e., coded -1, 0, +1) were about as likely to be accompanied by prosocial gossip as not 
(85/159 prosocial gossip; 53.5%). Positive replies were moderately correlated with prosocial 
gossip (.31, p ≤ .001) and with injunctions (.40, p ≤ .001).     
Table 4: General Linear Mixed Model Logistic Regression predicting sender and 
receiver cooperation after norm talk in Experiment 1 









Intercept -1.189 .305  -1.349† .259 
Controls      
  High Benefit 1.153 3.167  .626 1.870 
  Time -.097 .908  -.058 .943 
  Time2 .002 1.002  .001 1.001 
  High X Time .035 1.036  .029 1.029 
  Prior turn individual cooperation 2.772*** 16.000  2.981*** 19.701 
  Prior turn others cooperation .126 1.135  -.258 .773 
  Information about target -.163 .850    
      
Sender Norm Talk      
  Prosocial Gossip  .054 1.056  .048 1.049 
Prosocial Injunction .499*** 1.647  .175 1.192 
      
Receiver Response      
Positive Reply .337† 1.401  -.298 .743 
Prosocial Gossip x Positive Reply -.162 .850  .379 1.461 
Prosocial Injunction x Positive Reply -.127 .881  .333*** 1.395 
      
Group Intercept  1.941   1.487  
      
Percent Correctly Predicted 84.4   81.4  
N 513   513  
Note: *** p < .001; ** p < .01; * p < .05; † p < .1. 
 
 Receiver behavior: Replies to norm talk and cooperation. We first focus on the 
receivers’ cooperation. We expected that the receivers’ acceptance of an injunction would be 
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critical in predicting cooperation. It is when the receivers accept the senders’ injunctions that 
they would cooperate. We fit a Mixed Model Logistic Regression to receiver’s next-round 
cooperation using sender’s norm talk and the receiver’s response as predictors and including 
only the cases where norm talk was sent. We also controlled for the relevant experimental 
and other variables endogenous to the evolving levels of cooperation in the groups (i.e., the 
receiver’s cooperation in the previous turn, the cooperation of other members of the group). 
Table 4’s right columns reports the results. Consistent with our expectation, the receiver 
tends to cooperate when he or she receives an injunctive message and accepts it (i.e., 
prosocial injunction x positive reply interaction).  
Sender behavior: Norm talk and cooperation. We then explored the relationship 
between norm talk and cooperation focusing on the senders. Table 4’s left columns reports 
the result of a Mixed Model Logistic Regression analysis of sender’s immediate cooperation 
on the basis of sender’s gossip and injunction message content. We controlled for potential 
confounds as described in the receiver analysis above, as well as the information that the 
sender had received about the target’s cooperation over the last five rounds. This analysis 
showed that senders who have cooperated before, and sent a prosocial injunction, were more 
likely to cooperate in the next turn. Thus, norm talk can be interpreted as pledges. In this 
instance, the receiver’s reply appears to have little effect if any.  
Discussion 
 Consistent with our expectation, norm talk helps sustain cooperation in repeated 
public goods games. Although cooperation declines over time as previous studies have shown 
(e.g., Ledyard, 1995), norm talk helped to arrest this decline. These findings are similar to 
Feinberg et al.’s (2014) gossip only condition, in that gossip alone can arrest the decline of 
cooperation. However, we have extended their finding by showing that gossip does not have 
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to be shared by everyone in a group in order for it to be effective. In our experiment, a sender 
sent gossip to only one receiver at a time within a social network. 
The subsequent micro-level analyses supported our hypothesis that the exchange of 
injunctive norm talk – the combination of the sender’s injunctions and the receivers’ 
acceptances – drives up the cooperation levels of both the sender and receiver immediately 
following it. The senders tend to cooperate after sending their injunctive messages, and the 
receivers who respond positively to these tend to cooperate as well. Interestingly, it is the 
sending and replying to injunctions, rather than gossip, that explains the spike in cooperation 
following the norm talk. Nonetheless, this effect dissipates on the average after two or three 
rounds. This spiking pattern is in line with Cialdini et al.’s focus theory (1990, 1991), which 
suggests that norm salience drives normative conduct. If the salience of the norm declines 
across rounds, its effect on cooperation can be expected to dissipate. There may be other 
mechanisms that could account for this effect; we will explore this possibility more fully in 
the general discussion. 
The fact that the norm talk effect lasted up to the third round after the norm talk 
occurred is less consistent with an alternative mechanistic account. According to this account, 
norm talk could work by establishing a temporary mutual agreement between the sender and 
receiver to conditionally cooperate (vs. a norm of cooperation). At minimum, these findings 
suggest that an agreement to cooperate in the next round is not all that is going on. It is also 
important to note that in this paradigm (which does not permit participants to sanction each 
other for breaking an agreement) a mutual agreement to cooperate must nevertheless be 
backed up by the norm of promise keeping (Bicchieri, 2002) or commitment and consistency 
(Kerr & Kaufman-Gilliland, 1994). In other words, agreement to cooperate may be 
interpretable as an expression of the more specific norm of promise keeping, which can be 
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understood as secondary to the broader norm of cooperation. We will revisit this issue in 
Experiments 3 and 4. 
 Our findings that gossip tends to communicate accurate information about the target 
person, and is likely to be a moral and prosocial act, corroborates previous work (e.g., 
Feinberg et al., 2012; Peters & Kashima, 2015). At the same time, we did not observe gossip-
specific effects on cooperation, which is somewhat surprising in light of previous findings to 
the contrary (Feinberg et al., 2014). At this point, we surmised that there may be two possible 
reasons why gossip did not have a direct effect on senders’ or receivers’ cooperation. One 
possibility is that broadcast gossip as used in Feinberg et al. (2014) may enhance cooperation, 
but interpersonal gossip used in the current research has a weaker effect. Another possibility 
is that when gossip is combined with injunction, gossip may be regarded as an example or 
evidence that is used in support of the injunction. In this case, the senders’ and receivers’ 
thoughts may be directed primarily to the injunction itself, and only secondarily to the gossip. 
As a result, both cognitive and communicative processes may be mostly “about” injunctions. 
We examined these possibilities in Experiment 2. 
 
Experiment 2 
In order to examine the difference between injunction and gossip further, and to 
replicate and shed light on the process when injunction and gossip messages are combined, 
we factorially manipulated the capabilities to send injunction and gossip in Experiment 2. 
There were four conditions altogether: in the control condition, no norm talk was allowed; in 
the injunction only condition, only injunction was allowed; in the gossip only condition, only 
gossip was allowed; and in the combined condition, both injunction and gossip were allowed. 
These conditions all used an MPCR of .4, replicating the high benefit conditions in 
Experiment 1.  
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As in Experiment 1, we expected that cooperation would be sustained longer in the 
norm talk conditions than in the control condition, and that this is due to the capacity of norm 
talk to encourage and sustain cooperation in the short term, so that cooperation would “spike” 
following the communication. In addition, this design allowed us to examine the processes 
involving injunction and gossip separately without interference from each other. In particular, 
we wished to examine the role of receiver replies in the sustenance of cooperation. Our 
analysis suggests that receiver replies should play a critical role in sustaining cooperation in 
the injunction only condition, such that it is when the receivers accept the injunctions that 
they will cooperate. However, they should play a minor role if any in the gossip only 
condition. By comparing the combined condition to these injunction and gossip only 
conditions, we should be able to diagnose to what degree the ability of norm talk to sustain 
cooperation depends on inclusion of both the injunction and gossip components. 
 
Method 
Experiment 2 methods were identical to Experiment 1 with the following exceptions. 
In the instructions, participants were shown all of the messages, and told that they may be 
allowed to send none, some, or all of the messages. In the gossip only condition, participants 
were only presented with the dropdown boxes for gossip and approval of gossip. In the 
injunction only condition, participants did not receive any information about a target’s 
previous behavior, they were also only presented with one dropdown box for the injunction 
message. Reply options were identical to Experiment 1. 
Results 
A total of 208 participants, different from those in Experiment 1, in 52 usable groups 
were collected (as before, we aimed to collect a minimum of 12 complete groups per 
32 
 
condition). Only 30 of the 6448 (0.5%) public goods selections were missing and these were 
fairly evenly distributed among conditions (Table S7).  
Norm talk again sustains cooperation over time. Figure 4 presents average 
percentage of cooperative responses in the four conditions. Generally replicating Experiment 
1, the level of cooperation declined over time, most discernibly in the no communication 
control condition. However, the spikes found in Experiment 1 are again observable. The level 
of cooperation in the rounds immediately after norm talk picks up, followed by a gradual 
decrease, and this cyclical pattern continues in the norm talk conditions. Nevertheless, the 




























 Mixed Model Logistic Regression models were fit to cooperation decisions (Table 5). 
Replicating Experiment 1, a linear trend of time was negative and significant, showing a 
gradually declining cooperation level; however, a quadratic trend was also significant, 
suggesting that the rate of decline eased over time. Most importantly, injunction and gossip 
interacted with time. Injunction and gossip can arrest the declining level of cooperation, thus 
helping to sustain cooperation over time. In particular, the gossip only condition showed the 
highest level of cooperation. 
 






   
Intercept .118 1.125 
Injunction .601 1.824 
Gossip  1.370 3.934 
Time -0.90*** .914 
Time2 .001*** 1.001 
   
Injunction X Gossip  -1.848 .157 
   
Injunction X Time .019† 1.019 
Gossip X Time .030** 1.030 
Injunction X Gossip X Time -.029* .972 
   
Group Intercept  4.597  
   
% Correctly Predicted 75.7  
N 6418  
Note: *** p < .001; ** p < .01; * p < .05; † p < .1. 
 
Next, we fit a Mixed Model Logistic Regression to cooperation decisions in rounds 6 
to 31 in the norm talk conditions; dummy variables representing the one to four rounds after 
norm talk were also included (Table 6). This time, one and two rounds after norm talk 
showed higher levels of cooperation relative to the reference of five rounds after the 




Table 6: General Linear Mixed Model Logistic Regression predicting cooperation 





   
Intercept 1.262 3.532 
Injunction -1.195 .303 
Gossip  .092 1.096 
Time -.045 .956 
Time2 .001† 1.001 
   
Injunction X Time -.014 .986 
Gossip X Time -.018 .982 
   
Round After Norm Talk a   
  +1  .848*** 2.335 
  +2  .482*** 1.620 
  +3  .162 1.176 
  +4  .120 1.127 
   
Group Intercept  6.189  
   
Percent Correctly Predicted 77.7  
N 4051  
Note: *** p < .001; ** p < .01; * p < .05; † p < .1. 
 
Norm talk: What does it communicate and what are the consequences? The 
content of Experiment 2’s messages had similar patterns to Experiment 1. Participants in the 
norm talk conditions sent messages a majority of the time (804/936; 85.9%). When a message 
was sent, the receiver almost always replied (761; 94.7%). When a gossip message was 
allowed and sent, the approval-disapproval component was usually included with it (469/508; 
92.3%). When a message was sent in gossip-only or combined conditions, 64.1% (327/ 510) 
of them were coded as prosocial gossip (see Table S9 for more details).  
Truth, gossip, injunction, and replies. Gossip message valence was highly correlated 
to the information the sender received about the target’s cooperation (.84, p ≤ .001) again 
indicating a lack of malicious false gossip. In the combined condition when both gossip and 
injunction were included in the same message, the prosociality of the gossip (0 or 1) and 
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injunction messages were moderately correlated (.32, p ≤ .001). Similar to Experiment 1, 
extremely prosocial injunctions (i.e., coded +2) were frequently accompanied by prosocial 
gossip (88/115; 76.5%); however, extremely individualistic (i.e., coded -2) and moderate 
(i.e., coded -1, 0, +1) injunctions were mixed as to their inclusion of prosocial gossip (10/24; 
41.7% and 45/91; 49.5%, respectively). Mirroring Experiment 1, positive replies were 
moderately correlated with both prosocial gossip (.28, p ≤ .001, 480 cases) and prosocial 
injunction (.43, p ≤ .001, 503 cases). 
 Injunction only condition. Table 7 reports the results of the General Linear Mixed 
Model analyses for the injunction only condition. First, focusing on the receivers, receiving 
an injunction and accepting it increased their immediate cooperation. Consistent with our 
expectation, the receivers’ receipt and acceptance of an injunction was a significant predictor 
of their cooperation. Next, looking at the senders, their own norm talk did not predict their 
cooperation, but it was their receipt of the receivers’ acceptance that prompted their 
immediate cooperation. This difference from Experiment 1 highlights the importance of the 
receivers’ acceptance as a mechanism that sustained cooperation when injunction is the only 
form of norm talk. 
Table 7: General Linear Mixed Model Logistic Regression predicting sender and 
receiver cooperation after norm talk in the injunction only condition in Experiment 2 







Intercept -.802 .448 -1.699* .183 
Controls     
  Time -.087 .917 .008 1.008 
  Time2 .001 1.001 -.001 .999 
  Prior turn individual cooperation 2.497*** 12.144 2.578*** 13.170 
  Prior turn others cooperation .822** 2.276 .507* 1.660 
  Information about target .004 1.004   
     
Senders     
  Prosocial Injunction .250 1.284 .467** 1.595 
     
Receivers     
  Positive Reply .598** 1.819 .131 1.140 
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  Prosocial Injunction X Positive Reply -.157 .855 .363** 1.438 
     
Group Intercept  .225  .297  
     
Percent Correctly Predicted 83.7  83.3  
N 294  294  
Note: *** p < .001; ** p < .01; * p < .05; † p < .1. 
 
 Gossip only condition. In the gossip only condition, again, consistent with our 
expectation, receivers cooperated more when they received gossip, but cooperation was not 
contingent on how they replied (Table 8). Regardless of whether they accepted gossip or not, 
the sheer receipt of the gossip message was sufficient to instigate cooperation. The 
effectiveness of gossip in sustaining cooperation does not depend on how receivers respond 
to the gossip. Intriguingly, senders’ sending prosocial gossip did not enhance their likelihood 
of immediate cooperation.  
Table 8: General Linear Mixed Model Logistic Regression predicting sender and 
receiver cooperation after norm talk in the gossip only condition in Experiment 2 







Intercept -.254 .776 -1.238 .290 
Controls     
  Time .042 1.042 .092 1.097 
  Time2 -.002 .998 -.003 .997 
  Prior turn individual cooperation 2.281*** 9.785 2.446*** 11.547 
  Prior turn others cooperation .003 1.003 -.133 .875 
  Information about target -.125 .882   
     
Senders     
  Prosocial Gossip  .072 1.075 .951* 2.587 
     
Receivers     
  Positive Reply -.180 .835 -.270 .764 
  Prosocial Gossip X Positive Reply .512 1.668 .294 1.342 
     
Group Intercept  1.325  1.059  
     
Percent Correctly Predicted 83.8  83.4  
N 259  259  




Combined condition. This is a condition that closely replicates Experiment 1 in which 
both injunction and gossip can be communicated (Table 9). The findings are generally in line 
with the results from Experiment 1. The receiver’s acceptance of the sender’s injunction 
predicted the receiver’s cooperation immediately afterwards. Thus, the injunction-acceptance 
exchange appears to drive the cooperation of the receiver. Somewhat different from 
Experiment 1, we found a gossip x reply interaction effect on receivers’ cooperation, 
suggesting that the receiver’s acceptance of gossip messages too was a booster for the 
receiver cooperation. Again replicating Experiment 1, a sender’s sending an injunction 
predicted the sender’s cooperation immediately following the norm talk. 
Table 9: General Linear Mixed Model Logistic Regression predicting sender and 
receiver cooperation after norm talk in the combined condition in Experiment 2 







Intercept .900 2.458 .305 1.357 
Controls     
  Time -.137 .872 -.084 .919 
  Time2 .003 1.003 .001 1.001 
  Prior turn individual cooperation 2.091*** 8.091 2.301*** 9.981 
  Prior turn others cooperation -.322 .725 -.181 .835 
  Information about target -.124 .884   
     
Senders     
  Prosocial Gossip  .265 1.303 -.290 .748 
  Prosocial Injunction .419** 1.521 -.062 .940 
     
Receivers     
  Positive Reply .393† 1.480 -.584* .558 
  Prosocial Gossip X Positive Reply .011 1.011 .643* 1.902 
  Prosocial Injunction X Positive Reply -.201† .818 .504*** 1.655 
     
Group Intercept  .947  .220  
     
Percent Correctly Predicted 77.7  76.9  
N 251  251  





 As expected, norm talk can help sustain cooperation by boosting cooperation when it 
occurs. Replicating the results in Experiment 1, when participants could send injunction, 
gossip, or both, they could talk themselves into cooperation by increasing their levels of 
cooperation although the booster effect was relatively short-lived. Somewhat surprisingly, the 
level of cooperation was higher in the gossip only condition relative to the other norm talk 
conditions. We will return to this finding later. 
The detailed analyses of micro-level norm talk showed that the mechanisms for 
sustaining cooperation subtly differ for injunction and gossip. For injunctions, the receiver’s 
response was, as expected, critical. The “pure” injunctions made by the senders do not predict 
their cooperation in the injunction only condition without their receivers’ acceptance. 
Likewise, receivers were more likely to cooperate when they accepted the senders’ 
injunction. In the absence of receiver acceptance, the sender and the receiver were less likely 
to cooperate. Thus, mutual norm verification, i.e., the sender’s message making salient the 
norm of cooperation and the receiver’s agreement verifying the norm, was an important 
determinant of the effectiveness of pure injunctions. As we noted in Experiment 1, it is also 
possible that a receiver’s acceptance is interpreted as a pledge for mutual conditional 
cooperation (i.e., “I’ll cooperate if you cooperate.”). We address this possibility in 
Experiment 3. 
In contrast, for gossip, the receiver’s response did not predict cooperation. Pure gossip 
can sustain cooperation as long as it is sent – Beersma and Van Kleef (2011) may be right in 
emphasizing the amount of gossip circulated in a group as a critical factor that effects 
cooperation. It is important to note that the booster effect of pure gossip cannot be interpreted 
in terms of a mutual commitment for conditional cooperation. We suggest that gossip acts as 
a reminder of the injunctive norm and the reputational system that need to be monitored in 
social settings.  
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Within this spectrum, the role of norm talk was somewhat more complex in the 
combined condition where both injunction and gossip are available. The senders of an 
injunction, which often accompanied gossip, tended to cooperate after sending it, and their 
receipt of the receivers’ acceptance did not have a consistent effect (in both Experiment 1 and 
2, they were only marginally significant). As expected, the receivers of an injunction tended 
to cooperate when they accepted the injunction in both Experiments 1 and 2. In Experiment 
2, however, the receivers’ acceptance of gossip also indicated their cooperation too, though 
this was not observed in Experiment 1. In all, consistent with our expectation, the receivers’ 
acceptance of a norm talk message plays an important role in the combined condition too; 
however, the senders who sent injunctive messages were also likely to cooperate.  
Overall, the exchange of sender injunction and receiver acceptance appears to be a 
critical mechanism that drives cooperation when injunctions are sent. In both the injunction 
only and combined conditions, receivers’ cooperation was predicted by their receipt and 
acceptance of injunctions. In contrast, the effectiveness of gossip in increasing cooperation 
does not appear to depend on the receiver’s acceptance. We examine the meanings behind the 
exchanging of these norm talk messages in Experiment 3. 
Experiment 3 
Experiments 1 and 2 provided evidence that norm talk – injunction, gossip, or their 
combination – can sustain cooperation in repeated public goods games by making the 
injunctive norm of cooperation salient. Nevertheless, these studies have not provided direct 
evidence for our claims about the mechanisms. Our first aim here is to test our claim that 
injunction increases the salience of the cooperative norm, and that the receiver’s positive 
response verifies it. Our second aim is to explore an alternative mechanism, which is that the 
injunction-acceptance exchange is a mutual commitment to conditionally cooperate. In other 
words, it may be that the sender and the receiver are not so much agreeing that it is a good 
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thing (i.e., normatively right) to cooperate, as saying to each other, “if you cooperate, I’ll 
cooperate.” Note that while our reasoning does allow for the possibility that injunction can 
invoke a cooperation pledge, we expect such a pledge to be less salient than the norm and its 
verification. Our third aim is to test our claim that gossip simultaneously increases the 
salience of the underlying injunctive norm and the reputational system.  
To address these issues, Experiment 3 examined participants’ interpretation of norm 
talk consisting of injunction and/or gossip. Specifically, they were asked to indicate the 
extent to which each instance of norm talk implied (1) an injunctive norm of cooperation, (2) 
an intent to conditionally cooperate, and (3) reputational concern. Norm talk took the form of 
prosocial messages (e.g., “We should each contribute a lot to the group.”), and we compared 
ratings for these messages with two controls: non-prosocial messages (e.g., “We should each 
keep some for ourselves and contribute some to the group.”) and no message. We also asked 
participants to interpret a complete sender – receiver exchange. 
We hypothesize that prosocial injunction messages (with or without gossip) would be 
more likely interpreted as a reminder of the injunctive norm of cooperation than an intention 
to conditionally cooperate. Further, we hypothesize that receivers who agree with these 
prosocial messages would be more likely seen to be verifying the norm than conveying an 
intention to conditionally cooperate. We also hypothesize that pure gossip messages would be 
interpreted as a reminder of both the injunctive norm of cooperation and the reputational 
system.  
Method 
Participants. We estimated the number of participants required to obtain power = .80 
under the assumption that one of the critical hypotheses required an F-test to compare at most 
five conditions (dfhyp = 4) and at least three conditions (to be described in detail below) with a 
medium to strong effect size (d ≈ .65). According to Murphy and Myors (2004), this requires 
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dferror of approximately 120, or 20~30 per condition. To err on the conservative side, we 
aimed to collect data between approximately 40 and 50 per condition, because we expected a 
fairly large attrition rate in a sample recruited from Amazon Mechanical Turk based on our 
previous experience. In the end, 282 participants completed the study; no further data 
collection was undertaken. A catch question was included in the section about participants’ 
interpretations of the situation in which no message was received. It asked ‘If you read this 
item, please respond "Strong No"’. 61 participants who responded other than “Strong No” 
were deemed not to be paying sufficient attention to this task, and therefore removed from 
further analyses. In the end, 193 participants (92 men and 101 women) were retained (see 
Supplementary Information for the same analyses including those removed. We found results 
largely consistent with those reported here). 
Design and Procedure. Participants were told that the purpose of the study was to 
gain insight into the thinking of participants who had taken part in a previous experiment on 
decision making. To familiarise them with the previous experiment, participants were 
provided with a simplified version of the norm talk instructions. They were also given the 
opportunity to play two rounds of the public goods game (with pre-set feedback) and to 
complete two communication rounds. In the communication rounds they were asked to use 
the drop-down menus described in the previous experiments to construct one message about a 
player who had contributed on all of the previous five rounds and a second message about a 
player who had contributed on none of these rounds.  
Participants were then asked to take the receiver role and they were presented with 
different types of norm talk as a function of their allocation to one of five different 
conditions. As can be seen from Table 10, there was one injunction only condition. There 
were also two gossip only conditions and two combined gossip and injunction conditions, 
reflecting the fact that prosocial gossip can be framed positively or negatively: “Person C 
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contributed very much, and I strongly approve” or “Person A contributed very little, and I 
strongly disapprove”.  
 
Table 10. Sender messages presented to participants 
 Prosocial Message Non-prosocial Message 
Injunction We should each contribute a 
lot to this group. 
We should each keep some 
for ourselves and contribute 
some to the group. 
Gossip (Positive Frame) Person C contributed very 
much and I strongly 
approve. 
Person C contributed very 
much and I neither approve 
nor disapprove. 
Gossip (Negative Frame) Person C contributed very 
little and I strongly 
disapprove. 
Person C contributed very 
little and I neither approve 
nor disapprove. 
Combined (Positive Frame) Person C contributed very 
much and I strongly 
approve. We should each 
contribute a lot to this group. 
Person C contributed very 
much and I neither approve 
nor disapprove. We should 
each keep some for 
ourselves and contribute 
some to the group. 
Combined (Negative Frame) Person C contributed very 
little and I strongly 
disapprove. We should each 
contribute a lot to the group. 
Person C contributed very 
little and I neither approve 
nor disapprove. We should 
keep some for ourselves and 
give some to the group. 
 
 
In each condition, participants were asked to report their interpretation of three 
different messages: prosocial, non-prosocial, and no message. They were also asked to 
indicate how they would respond to the prosocial and non-prosocial messages, and describe 
what they meant by their response. Interpretations were elicited with the following statement: 
“By sending this message, [the person is] basically saying…”. Participants were then asked to 
respond to five items on 5-point scales (where +2 = strong Yes, +1 = yes, 0 = neither, -1 = no 
and -2 = strong no). Two items measured an injunctive norm, “I think people should 
contribute” and “It is a good thing to contribute” (they were averaged due to good reliability; 
α > .77). Two items tapped into reputational concern, “I don’t like people who don’t 
contribute” and “I wouldn’t like to do this task with people who don’t contribute” (they were 
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averaged because their reliability was acceptable, α > .69). One item measured intention to 
conditionally cooperate, “I will contribute if you contribute.” The order of items was 
randomized across presentations.  
After completing the sender message and receiver response ratings, participants were 
presented with a norm talk-agreement exchange consisting of a prosocial message and the 
response, “I strongly agree with you.” They were then asked to rate their interpretation of the 
exchange in terms of norm verification (“They agree that people should contribute”) and 
mutual commitment (“They promise each other that they will contribute”). Participants 
responded to several additional items that we do not describe here. They were removed from 
analyses because they were either irrelevant to the hypothesis or because our item analyses 
found that the factor structure of the reduced set of items was clearer and less ambiguous than 
the full set. Please see Supplementary Information (Analyses for Experiment 3, Interpretation 
Ratings) for further detail and evidence that, with one exception, our results hold if we repeat 
our analyses with the full set of items and entire sample (i.e., including those who failed the 
manipulation check)1. After completing one more section, which is unrelated to this 
experiment, participants were asked about their demographics, debriefed, and thanked for 
their participation. 
Results 
Preliminary Analyses. We first examined whether there is a meaningful difference 
between positively and negatively framed messages with a view to aggregating across them. 
We used t-test to compare the interpretation ratings for gossip and combined messages 
separately (this resulted in 31 comparisons per condition). Only three comparisons were 
significant, all other |t| < 1.952. Specifically, in the combined condition, the positively framed 
                                                          
1 When the analyses are conducted with the entire sample and full scales, the significant interaction between 
message prosociality and norm talk type on ratings of reputational concern no longer achieves significance, 




message was rated as providing a stronger signal of the norm of cooperation, M = 1.63 vs. 
1.17, t(77) = 2.11, p = .038, and a weaker signal of reputational issues, M = .55 vs. 1.07, t(77) 
= 2.46, p. = .016, than the negatively framed message. In the gossip condition too, the 
positively framed message was rated as providing a weaker signal of reputational issues, M 
= .49 vs. 1.11, t(72) = 2.59, p = .022. Because there are only a few significant comparisons 
(and approximately as many as would be expected based on chance), and the differences that 
were observed were of quantity rather than quality (i.e., they all fell on the same side of the 
neutral scale point), we aggregated across frame. Further support for this decision was 
provided by a cluster analysis using the mean ratings on the items for each of the five norm 
talk types. The Between-Groups Linkage algorithm showed a clear pattern of two clusters: 
one cluster for both the positively and negatively framed gossip messages, and the other 
cluster for the injunction and positively and negatively framed combined messages. As a 
result, the analyses that we report below relate to three types of norm talk: injunction, gossip, 
and combined messages. 
Injunction signals norms more than conditional cooperation. To test our 
hypothesis that injunction messages (with or without gossip) are interpreted more as a 
reminder of the injunctive norm than an offer of conditional cooperation, we first compared 
injunctive norm and conditional cooperation ratings. We examined these ratings for prosocial 
and control messages (where control ratings were the average for non-prosocial and no 
messages), and explored the difference between injunction and combined messages, using a 
mixed-design three-way ANOVA on ratings as the dependent variable with interpretation 
type (injunctive norm vs. conditional cooperation) and prosociality of message (prosocial vs. 
control) as within-participant factors and message type (injunction vs. combined) as a 
between-participant factor. There was a large effect of interpretation type, F(1,117) = 65.93, 
ηp2 = .36, p = .000, where the injunctive norm interpretation (M = .81, SE = .06) was 
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endorsed more than the conditional cooperation interpretation (M = .16, SE = .07). This was 
qualified by an interpretation type x prosociality interaction, F(1,117) = 46.12, ηp2 = .28, p 
= .000, indicating that the norm interpretation was far more strongly endorsed for the 
prosocial relative to the control message, M = 1.50 vs. .13, than conditional cooperation 
interpretation, M = .43 vs. -.11.  
There was an effect of prosociality, F(1,117) = 97.26, ηp2 = .49, p = .000, and a two-
way effect of prosociality and message type, F(1,117) = 5.65, ηp2 = .05, p = .011, such that 
the contrast between prosocial and control messages was greater for the injunction (M = 1.08 
vs. -.11) than for the combined messages (M = .86 vs. .13), but there was no three-way, 
F(1,117) = 1.60, ηp2 = .01, p. = .208, or other effect. Table 11 reports the mean ratings. 
Clearly, prosocial injunction and combined messages were interpreted as a reminder of the 
injunctive norm of cooperation; both means were significantly greater than the neutral point 
of zero (1.57 and 1.42). Participants saw prosocial injunction or combined messages as an 
offer of conditional cooperation to some extent. Both means were greater than the neutral 
point (.58 and .29), suggesting that injunctions connote conditional cooperation; however, 
they were lower than those for injunctive normative interpretations as shown by the paired 
sample t-tests (Table 11).  
 
Table 11: Mean ratings of the prosocial message and third party interpretations. 
 Injunction Combined Gossip 
Message Interpretation Prosocial Non Prosocial Non Prosocial Non 
Injunctive Norm 1.57** .05 1.42** .21** 1.53** -.09 
Conditional Cooperation .58** -.27** .29* .06 .23 -.29** 
Reputational Concern .71** .16 .83** -.22** .98** -.34** 
t-test comparing 
injunctive norm and 
conditional cooperation 
5.21**  7.88**  9.94**  
       
Third Party Interpretation       
Norm Verification 1.63**  1.59**  1.62**  
Conditional Cooperation 1.05*  1.10**  .28*  
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t-test comparing norm 
verification and 
conditional cooperation 
3.80**  4.85**  9.27**  
 Note: t-test of H0: μ = 0, ** p < .01; * p < .05. For independent sample t-tests, ** p < .01; * p 
< .05. Ratings vary from -2 (Strong No), 0 (Neither), to +2 (Strong Yes).  
 
Second, we examined the meaning of the receivers’ response. Recall that, after they 
were presented with a sender’s message, the participants chose their response as a receiver 
(i.e., whether they agreed with the message or not) and then rated the meaning that they 
intended to convey with the response. We coded the response in terms of receiver agreement, 
that is, the degree to which the response agreed with the sender message in the exact same 
manner as in Experiments 1 and 2. We then correlated this index with the extent to which 
participants meant to verify the underlying injunctive norm (i.e., norm verification, or 
agreeing with the injunctive norm) and the extent to which participants mean to communicate 
their intent to conditionally cooperate (i.e., mutual conditional cooperation, or agreeing that 
they would cooperate if the sender cooperates).  
 Table 12 reports the correlations. When receivers agreed to an injunction or a 
combined message, they clearly implied norm verification. Receiver agreement highly 
correlated with norm verification for injunction (.82), and also for combined messages (.60). 
It is noteworthy that receiver agreement also correlated with conditional cooperation for 
injunction (.46), suggesting that receivers may convey an intent to conditionally cooperate 
when they agreed with an injunction. However, receiver agreement appears to imply norm 
verification more than conditional cooperation. The correlation of receiver agreement with 
norm verification was significantly greater than that with conditional cooperation (Hoerger, 
2013; Steiger, 1980). Furthermore, the partial correlation of receiver agreement with norm 
verification remained significant when conditional cooperation was controlled, but the 
reverse was not true – the partial correlation of receiver agreement with conditional 
cooperation became nonsignificant when norm verification was controlled, suggesting that 
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the receiver agreement-conditional cooperation correlation was a by-product of norm 
verification. There is no evidence that receiver agreement with a combined prosocial message 
implied an intent to conditionally cooperate. Receiver agreement did not correlate with 
conditional cooperation for combined messages (.18).  
 
Table 12: Correlation of receiver agreement with norm verification and conditional 
cooperation. 
Interpretation Injunction Combined Gossip 
Norm Verification (rnv) .817** .603** .657** 
Conditional Cooperation (rcc) .462** .179 .165 
Comparison between rnv and rcc 3.56** 3.62** 4.55** 
Partial correlation with Norm 
Verification controlling for Conditional 
Cooperation (prnv.cc) 
.760** .586** .658** 
Partial correlation with Conditional 
Cooperation controlling for Norm 
Verification (prcc.nv) 
.050 -.009 -.173 
Note. ** p. < .01.  
 
Finally, we examined how participants interpreted from a third party perspective an 
exchange that involved a sender’s prosocial norm talk and a receiver’s agreement with it. As 
a third party, participants interpreted norm talk-agreement exchanges more as norm 
verification than mutual commitment to cooperate. The mean ratings for norm verification 
were higher than those for mutual commitment to cooperate in all conditions (see Table 11). 
To verify this, we conducted a mixed-design ANOVA on third party ratings with 
interpretation type (norm verification vs. conditional cooperation) as a within-participant 
factor and message type (injunction vs. combined) as a between-subject factor. The only 
significant effect was due to interpretation type, F(1,117) = 35.65, ηp2 = .234, p = .000. The 
norm verification interpretation was endorsed more (M = 1.61, SE = .062) than the 
conditional cooperation interpretation (M = 1.08, SE = .097). There was some indication that 
these exchanges implied a degree of mutual commitment to cooperate (see Table 11); the 
mean ratings of conditional cooperation were above the midpoint. However, norm 
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verification was rated to be more pertinent than mutual commitment in all conditions (Table 
11).  
Gossip is a reminder of norm and reputation. We theorized that gossip explicitly 
speaks to a particular individual’s reputation, but in so doing implicitly implies the 
underlying injunctive norm. So, first, we expected that gossip would be interpreted as 
implying the injunctive norm of cooperation, potentially less so than injunction and combined 
messages. This was indeed the case. The injunctive normative interpretation conferred to 
prosocial gossip was rated at 1.53, significantly above the neutral midpoint of zero (Table 
11). Furthermore, this was significantly greater than the control, t(74) = 15.30, p < .001. We 
examined whether gossip was interpreted differently from injunction and combined messages 
by conducting a repeated measures ANOVA on normative interpretation with message 
prosociality (prosocial vs. control) as a within-subject factor and norm talk type (injunction 
vs. combined vs. gossip) as a between-participant factor. There was a strong effect of 
prosociality, F(1,190) = 442.70, ηp2 = .700, p = .000, showing that all prosocial norm talk was 
normatively interpreted (M = 1.51, SE = .06) compared to the control (M = .06, SE = .05). 
Overall, an inspection of the means suggests that gossip appears to be interpreted as a 
reminder of the injunctive norm at a level similar to pure injunction or combined messages 
(Table 11). However, there was a significant interaction between prosociality and norm talk 
type, F(2,180) = 3.93, ηp2 = .040, p = .021, which suggests that, if anything, relative to the 
control, prosocial gossip implicates the injunctive norm (prosocial – control = 1.62) as much 
as prosocial injunction (prosocial – control = 1.53), and even more than prosocial combined 
messages (prosocial – control = 1.22).  
 In addition, we suggested that gossip would be interpreted as implicating reputational 
concerns more than injunction. This expectation was also supported (for means, see Table 
11). When we conducted an analogous ANOVA with reputational concern as the dependent 
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variable, there was a main effect of message prosociality, F(1,190) = 158.09, ηp2 = .454, p 
= .00; however, this was moderated by norm talk type, F(2,190) = 7.10, ηp2 = .070, p = .00. 
Relative to the control, prosocial gossip was seen to implicate reputational concerns 
(prosocial – control = 1.32) more than prosocial injunction (prosocial – control = .56). 
Prosocial combined messages (prosocial – control = 1.05) were perceived as being between 
pure injunction and pure gossip, but perhaps more akin to gossip. This makes sense because 
combined messages contained gossip information as well.   
Finally, we examined what the receiver’s agreement with gossip may mean. Table 12 
reports the correlation of the receiver’s agreement with norm verification and also conditional 
cooperation. Clearly, agreeing to gossip implies norm verification (r = .657, p < .001), but not 
conditional cooperation (r = .165, n.s.). Also, the correlation of receiver agreement with norm 
verification is marginally weaker for gossip (r = .657) than for injunction (r = .817), z = 1.78, 
p = .075. Put differently, disagreement with pure injunction can undermine the normative 
status of the injunction marginally more than disagreement with pure gossip, making gossip 
less vulnerable to a challenge than pure injunction. In this regard, combined messages appear 
to be similar (r = .603) to gossip.  
Discussion 
 Experiment 3 was designed to examine three main issues. First, we sought and 
obtained evidence for our claim that injunction and combined norm talk remind its receivers 
of the injunctive norm of cooperation, and the receiver’s agreement with this type of norm 
talk verifies the status of the injunction as a norm. As expected, injunction and combined 
norm talk was likely to be interpreted as an assertion of the norm of cooperation, the 
receiver’s agreement to it was meant to be an expression of its verification, and the norm 
talk-agreement exchange was seen as a mutual verification of the norm of cooperation. 
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Second, we wished to examine the rival hypothesis that a norm talk-agreement 
exchange may be interpreted as an agreement to cooperate with each other conditional on the 
other party’s cooperation. The participant ratings suggested that the participants also 
interpreted norm talk as potentially indicating the message sender’s intention to conditionally 
cooperate. However, this interpretation was secondary to the first injunctive normative 
interpretation. The level of endorsement was always lower for conditional cooperation 
interpretation than for injunctive normative interpretation.  
As well, as we noted earlier, even if injunction and combined messages imply a 
pledge to cooperate and an agreement to conditionally cooperate, the fact that this mutual 
agreement is carried out may be due to the norm of promise keeping (Bicchieri, 2002). This is 
because, in the present experiments, there was no tangible sanction associated with breaking 
a promise. In the context of social dilemmas, the injunctive norm of cooperation may also 
activate the more specific injunctive norm of promise keeping. 
Third, we sought and found evidence for our claim that gossip conveys reputational 
implications, but at the same time acts as a reminder of the injunctive norm underlying the 
reputational judgments. As expected, gossip was seen to implicate reputations more than the 
pure injunction or combined messages. It was somewhat surprising that the injunctive 
normative interpretation was as strongly endorsed for gossip as for injunction and combined 
message. Apparently, without explicitly saying so, gossip implicates the norm of cooperation 
as much as its explicit statements, at least in the context of public goods dilemma games.  
The results of Experiment 3 may shed some light on the finding that the level of 
cooperation was highest in the gossip only condition in Experiment 2, even higher than in the 
injunction only or combined conditions. First of all, gossip reminds its receivers of both the 
norm and the reputational system, more so than pure injunctions or combined messages. 
Therefore, gossip may be a powerful “cloak and dagger”, firstly, holding out a silent threat of 
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reputational damage or a social reward of status gain, and secondly, simultaneously 
upholding the injunctive norm of cooperation and shielding it from challenges. Nonetheless, 
it remains to be seen whether gossip always outperforms injunction in sustaining cooperation 
in social dilemmas. 
Experiment 4 
 Experiment 4 aimed to examine participants’ interpretations of messages, and 
message-reply exchange in an actual public goods game, using the paradigm described in 
Experiments 1 and 2. This experiment also included a non-norm talk communication 
condition, in which a sender could make a pledge to contribute (i.e., conditional cooperation).  
Experiment 4 therefore included three conditions that varied the types of messages that were 
exchanged. In the injunction only and gossip only conditions, the messages and replies were 
the same as those in Experiment 2. In the conditional cooperation condition, participants were 
given a chance to send a message that promises a conditional cooperation, “I will definitely 
contribute if you agree to contribute. Do you agree to contribute?” and to reply by agreeing or 
disagreeing.  
In this way, we aimed to answer three main questions. First, we examined whether 
norm talk and promises of conditional cooperation are equally effective at sustaining 
cooperation. We do this because Experiment 3 found that while norm talk more strongly 
implies the norm of cooperation than conditional cooperation, it is also interpreted as a 
conditional cooperation pledge. Second, we sought to replicate our Experiment 3 findings 
about receivers’ interpretations of senders’ messages. Specifically, we expected that 
messages would be interpreted as connoting injunctive norms to a greater degree in the 
injunction and gossip conditions than in the conditional cooperation condition. We also 
expected that the reputational issues would be rated most important in the gossip condition 
and least important in the conditional cooperation condition. Third, we examined whether 
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participants’ interpretations for their message-reply exchanges – as norm verification, 
reputational concerns, or conditional cooperation – predicted their cooperation. In light of our 
Experiment 3 findings that agreement in both the injunction and gossip conditions were 
interpreted as implying norm verification, we expected norm verification to predict 
cooperation in both the injunction and gossip conditions, reputational concern to predict 
cooperation in the gossip condition, and conditional cooperation to predict cooperation in the 
conditional cooperation condition. However, in light of the results of Experiment 3 that norm 
talk also connotes conditional cooperation to some degree, we thought that conditional 
cooperation may also predict cooperation in the injunction and gossip conditions.  
Method 
The methods were identical to Experiment 2 with the following exceptions. First, we 
included the Experiment 3 message rating tasks into each communication round. This meant 
that upon receiving the message, and before replying, receivers were asked to interpret the 
message. Additionally, at the end of the communication round, senders and receivers were 
asked to rate their own interpretations of their message-reply exchange. This substantially 
increased the steps required to complete each communication round; to manage participant 
demands, we reduced the number of game and communication rounds (to 16 and 3, 
respectively). Second, rather than being presented with all of the messages, the sender saw 
and chose the message from one of the three sets of messages according to the condition. 
Messages for gossip and injunction conditions were identical to Experiment 2. In the 
conditional cooperation condition the messages were promises of conditional cooperation 
such as “I will definitely contribute if you agree to contribute. Do you agree to contribute?” 
(see Table S5 for details). Third, in all conditions, receivers could choose a reply from “I 
strongly disagree with you” to “I strongly agree with you”. Fourth, we increased the 
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minimum number of groups per condition to 20 as differences in interpretation would require 
more statistical power to detect compared to differences in cooperation only. 
Results and Discussion 
A total of 256 participants in 64 usable groups were collected with at least 21 
complete groups per condition. Only 8 of the 4096 (0.19%) public goods selections were 
missing and these were evenly distributed among conditions (Table S7).  
 Norm talk sustains cooperation over time. Figure 5 depicts the average percentage 
of cooperation in the three conditions. From this, while cooperation shows the expected 
temporal decline to some extent, it is not as marked as in Experiments 1 and 2 presumably 
due fewer decision rounds (16 as opposed to 31). Levels of cooperation appear to be 
comparable across the three conditions, but they appear to be somewhat higher in the norm 
talk conditions than in the conditional cooperation condition. To formally test these 
observations, Mixed Model Logistic Regression models were fit to cooperation decisions 
(Table 13). This revealed a significant negative quadratic trend of time, suggesting a decline 
towards the end of the time series, and a marginally significant effect of injunction, such that 
levels of cooperation in the injunction condition were somewhat higher than those in the 
conditional cooperation condition. The results imply that norm talk is at least as effective as a 
promise of conditional cooperation in sustaining cooperation, with a suggestion that 




Figure 5. Mean cooperation levels in Experiment 4 
 






Intercept .003 1.003 
Injunction (dummy) 1.199† 3.317 
Gossip (dummy) .387 1.473 
Time .041 1.042 
Time2 -.006** .994 
   
Injunction X Time .029 1.030 
Gossip X Time .028 1.029 
   
Group Intercept  4.810  
   
% Correctly Predicted 76.4% 1 
N 4088  
Note: *** p < .001; ** p < .01; * p < .05; † p =.098. Reference for dummy coding = conditional 
cooperation condition. 
 
 Next, we fit a Mixed Model Logistic Regression predicting round 6 to 16 cooperation 
























communication round (Table 14). There was a significant declining trend (negative linear 
trend of time). The round immediately after communication showed significantly higher 
levels of cooperation relative to the reference. Although the other effects were not significant, 
the estimated coefficients suggest that the effect of communication was greatest immediately 
following it and gradually waned over the subsequent rounds. 
 
Table 14: General Linear Mixed Model Logistic Regression predicting cooperation for 





   
Intercept .967 2.629 
Injunction (dummy) .979 2.662 
Gossip (dummy) .698 2.009 
Time -.128 .880 
Time2 .001 1.001 
   
Injunction X Time .061 1.063 
Gossip X Time .002 1.002 
   
Round After Norm Talk a   
  +1  .490** 1.632 
  +2  .087 1.091 
  +3  -.052 .949 
  +4  -.164 .849 
   
Group Intercept    
   
Percent Correctly Predicted 80.3  
N 2814  
Note: *** p < .001; ** p < .01; * p < .05; † p < .1. a +5 rounds after norm talk is the reference  
 
Norm talk. The patterns of norm talk were similar to Experiments 1 and 2. 
Participants sent messages most of the time 765/768 (99.6%): 251/252 (99.6%) in the 
injunction condition, 262/264 (99.2%) in the gossip condition, and 252/252 (100%) in the 
conditional cooperation condition. When a message was sent, the receiver replied most of the 
time 747/768 (97.2%): 247/252 (98.0%) in the injunction condition, 256/264 (97.0%) in the 
gossip condition, and 242/252 (96.0%) in the conditional cooperation condition. A majority 
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of the messages was prosocial, 509/765 (66.5%): 186/251 (74.1%) in the injunction 
condition, 183/262 (69.9%) in the gossip condition, and 157/252 (62.3%) in the conditional 
cooperation condition. See Table S16 for complete counts of norm talk content. 
 Norm talk is interpreted as an assertion of an injunctive norm. The ratings of 
message interpretations were first analyzed using an ANOVA with message prosociality 
(sender’s message was prosocial vs. not prosocial), condition (injunction, gossip, and 
conditional cooperation), and interpretation (injunctive norm, reputational concern, and 
conditional cooperation) with the last being a within-participant factor. Message prosociality 
had a main effect, F(1,741) = 33.21, p < .001, and this was not qualified by any higher order 
interaction effects, all F < 1.54. This suggests that prosocial messages were interpreted to 
have more prosocial implications (M = .85, SD = .98) than non-prosocial messages (M = .38, 
SD = .99). There were also main effects of condition and interpretation, F(2,741) = 4.13, p 
= .016, and F(2,740) = 87.95, Wilks’ Λ = .808, p < .001, respectively, although they were 
qualified by a significant condition x interpretation interaction, F(4,1480) = 4.51, Wilks’ Λ 
= .976,  p. = .001. Table 15 shows the mean ratings for the interaction.  
This reveals that the ratings of message interpretations were higher for injunctive 
norm than for conditional cooperation in all conditions, although this difference was smallest 
in the conditional cooperation condition. This is verified by a significant interaction due to 
interpretation type (injunctive norm vs. conditional cooperation) and condition, F(2,744) = 
6.96, Wilks’ Λ = .982, p < .01. It is interesting to note that even an offer to conditionally 
cooperate (I’ll cooperate if you cooperate) is seen to connote the injunctive norm of 
cooperation in public goods games (albeit less than in the injunction and gossip conditions, 
F(2,744) = 12.36, p < .001; injunction vs. conditional cooperation, t(486) = 4.31, p < .001, 
gossip vs. conditional cooperation, t(498) = 4.10, p < .001). This analysis also revealed that 
the conditional cooperation condition evoked less reputational concern than the other two 
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conditions, F(2,744) = 6.47, p < .01 (injunction vs. conditional cooperation, t(487) = 2.70, p 
< .01, gossip vs. conditional cooperation, t(498) = 3.49, p < .001; unexpectedly, ratings in the 
injunction and gossip conditions were comparable, t(503) = .67, p = .50).  
 











Note: ** p < .01; * p < .05; † p < .1; all means are significantly greater than 0 (neutral point) 
at p < .001 by independent t-tests. 
 
Norm verification precipitates cooperation. We investigated which interpretation of 
the participants’ message-reply exchanges – norm verification, conditional cooperation, and 
reputational concern – predicted their cooperation with a General Linear Mixed Model 
Logistic Regression analysis while controlling for the same predictors as in Experiments 1 
and 2. Table 16 reports the coefficient for each interpretation in the relevant conditions for 
senders and receivers separately. The results of the full model are reported in Supplementary 
Information (Table S17).  
Table 16. Coefficient for the interpretations of message-reply exchange by senders and 
receivers in predicting their cooperation in the subsequent round 
 Injunction Gossip Conditional 
Cooperation 
 Sender Receiver Sender Receiver Sender Receiver 
Norm Verification .28† .47** .63** .46** .22 .15 
Conditional Cooperation .12 .74** .40* .60** .53** .19 
Reputational Concern .01 .15 .33* .21 -.08 .01 
Note: ** p < .01; * p < .05; † p < .1 
 
 Injunction Gossip Conditional 
Cooperation 
Message Interpretation    
Injunctive Norm 1.13 1.07 .67 
Conditional Cooperation .84 .64 .52 
Reputational Concern .54 .60 .30 
t-test comparing 
injunctive norm and 
conditional cooperation 
5.38** 7.60** 3.25** 
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Consistent with our expectation, norm verification was an important driver of 
cooperation for both senders and receivers in both the injunction and gossip conditions. In 
contrast, norm verification did not predict cooperation in the conditional cooperation 
condition. Again, consistent with our expectation, reputational concern predicted senders’ 
cooperation in the gossip condition, but not in the injunction condition; reputational concerns 
did not predict cooperation in the conditional cooperation condition. As expected, conditional 
cooperation interpretation – a message-reply exchange interpreted as a promise of conditional 
cooperation – predicted the message senders’ cooperation in the conditional cooperation.  
However, somewhat unexpectedly, conditional cooperation did not predict the 
message receivers’ cooperation. This finding is particularly intriguing because conditional 
cooperation interpretation predicted receivers’ cooperation in both the injunction and gossip 
conditions. To put it differently, the receivers’ interpretation that their communication 
implied a promise to cooperate had a binding effect on the message receivers to cooperate 
only in the norm talk conditions. This may be because they saw verification of the norm of 
cooperation as implying a verification of the norm of promise keeping as well. As we 
discussed in Experiment 3, a promise of conditional cooperation does not, in and of itself, 
ensure people would cooperate. A promise to cooperate can ensure cooperation only when it 
is backed up by the norm of promise keeping. In the conditional cooperation condition, the 
norm of promise keeping may not have been as salient. In fact, there is even an incentive for 
people to “cheap talk” their communication partners into cooperation while choosing to 
defect themselves. This is because a defector’s payoff increases in the public goods game if 
there is one additional cooperator. It would be important to investigate the role potentially 





The present research has shown that language-based interpersonal norm talk within a 
social network can sustain cooperation in social dilemma situations as modelled by repeated 
public goods games. The ability to use a complex language is a uniquely human capacity. 
Whether human language has evolved to solve the collective action problem in human 
society (Dunbar, 1996, 2004), it appears to be an effective tool by which to do so. Even with 
the very limited capacities to exchange norm talk and replies that we used in the current 
experiments, it can act to activate the injunctive norm of cooperation and sustain cooperation 
with or without the power of reputational information. Both explicit and implicit norm talk – 
injunction and gossip – can make salient the injunctive norm of cooperation as well as a more 
specific norm of promise keeping. Consistent with focus theory (Cialdinini et al., 1990, 
1991), norm talk can arrest declining cooperation. Such communicative regulation of 
collective action is not only possible but may also be highly beneficial in sustaining human 
cooperation. This is because it does not require any additional tangible resources other than 
the cost of maintaining the communication channels. Although this cost is not negligible, 
norm talk seems to represent a relatively low cost alternative to punishment and other forms 
of social regulation of collective action. 
 Nevertheless, there are subtly different aspects to the mechanisms by which norm talk 
sustain cooperation depending on their types. On the one hand, injunction maintains 
cooperation by the interactants’ mutual verification of the injunctive norm. When both the 
sender and receiver of an injunction say that they should cooperate, this injunction-
acceptance exchange verifies the injunctive norm of cooperation. There appears to be an 
element of a de facto “contract” that they both contribute to the public goods. As shown in 
Experiment 3, however, the de facto contract element is secondary to the mutual verification 
of the injunctive norm of cooperation, and perhaps backed by the norm of promise keeping as 
a more specific norm implied by the norm of cooperation. Consistent with this interpretation, 
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Experiment 4 showed that both norm verification and conditional cooperation underpinned 
cooperation. By cumulating these dyadic verifications of the norm and tacit agreements to 
cooperate within a group, people can arrest the declining trend towards non-cooperation. On 
the other hand, gossip, when communicated, acts as a reminder of the norm and reputational 
implications to its receivers. Both Experiments 3 and 4 showed the importance of reputational 
concern in addition to norm verification as a significant driver of cooperation in the gossip 
condition. Presumably if it is positive gossip, it reminds its receiver of the benefits of social 
status and approval, whereas if it is negative it illustrates to the receiver the disapproval 
heaped on those who deviate from the norm. In everyday life, this approval is linked to 
tangible rewards and this disapproval to social sanctions such as punishment and ostracism.  
 Different types of norm talk appear to send subtly different signals. An injunction 
message with gossip appears to signal the sender’s intention to cooperate, or it can be taken 
as a pledge to cooperate (i.e., in Experiment 1 and the combined condition in Experiment 2); 
gossip sent alone says little about the sender’s intention; and an injunction sent alone seems 
to mean that the sender awaits the receiver’s consent, rather than announcing a unilateral 
decision to contribute to the public goods – presumably for fear of being a sucker who ends 
up benefiting a free rider. Injunctive norm talk may be taken as a unilateral pledge to 
cooperate only when it accompanies gossip, or reputational information about a concrete 
individual. 
One interpretation is that gossip may have a different meaning when it accompanies 
injunctions. Gossip sent alone is a reminder of reputational implications of a particular action 
as well as of the injunctive norm. The results are mixed as to whether gossip’s dual “cloak 
and dagger” will consistently produce higher cooperation (i.e., Experiment 2 vs Experiment 
4). However, gossip sent with an injunction acts as an exemplification of the injunctive norm: 
that is, the message says, “Here is someone who has violated the norm, it is to be 
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disapproved, and we should all adhere to the norm.” Our Experiment 3 corroborates this 
interpretation. Combined messages were interpreted more similarly to injunctions than to 
gossip. Thus fortified, the sender of the injunctive statement may feel certain about its moral 
righteousness and simply carries out its implication in action, and thus the receiver’s explicit 
acceptance is unnecessary. It may be this feeling of sharedness, which Echterhoff et al. 
(2009) called shared reality, that makes the difference, in this instance, the anticipation of 
shared morality. 
In contrast, an offer to conditionally cooperate was not more effective than norm talk 
in sustaining cooperation in Experiment 4. We found that conditional cooperation can in and 
of itself maintain cooperation to some extent; people tend to cooperate after making a 
promise to cooperate. Interestingly, norm talk communications are also interpreted to entail a 
promise of conditional cooperation as shown in Experiments 3 and 4; however, norm talk 
appears to entail additional implications – a reminder of the general norm of cooperation plus 
the specific norm of promise keeping. It was in the norm talk conditions where these norms 
are salient that conditional cooperation was an especially powerful driver of cooperation in 
message receivers’ decisions in the social dilemma situations. In the conditional cooperation 
condition, where communications had relatively weak normative connotations, promise of 
cooperation did not predict cooperation. Although this last finding was unexpected, it 
nonetheless highlights the importance of injunctive norms. 
Finally, we observed in Experiments 1, 2, and 4, the consistent pattern of spike and 
decline in cooperation following interpersonal communication. Whereas the spike may be 
explained by the norm salience in line with Cialdini et al.’s focus theory (1990, 1991), the 
decline may be somewhat more difficult to explain purely by norm salience. In fact, the 
decline mimics the typical pattern of cooperation in repeated public goods games (e.g., 
Fischbacher, Gächter, & Fehr, 2001; Isaac & Walker, 1988), and Fischbacher et al. explained 
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this as follows. At the start of a game, people’s expectations that others would cooperate are 
often somewhat higher than the actual level of cooperation; as they continue to play the game 
repeatedly, their expectation that others would cooperate is often violated and their lowered 
expectation drives down the cooperation level. Likewise, immediately following norm talk, 
the norm salience may increase participants’ levels of expectations that others would 
cooperate. However, their expectations may be unrealistically high – their observation that 
the actual cooperation does not match their expectations may drive down their cooperation 
subsequently as the effect of the norm of cooperation dissipates until the next round of 
communication. The cyclical pattern of spike and decline may be explained in terms of the 
cycle of norm salience-raised expectation-expectation violation. Future research should 
investigate the possibility that norm talk may affect cooperation through expectations of 
others’ cooperation. 
How is the Current Experimental Paradigm Different from Previous Paradigms? 
Although the present research has some similarities with the previous work, it differs 
from it in several respects. First, in most research on communication and social dilemmas, 
participants were usually allowed to engage in unhindered group discussions where everyone 
could communicate with everyone else at the same time (for an exception, see Kinukawa et 
al., 2000); in contrast, in the current studies, participants could only concurrently send a 
message to one other participant, and reply to another participant’s message. As well, the 
current communication structure significantly diverges from that examined by Feinberg et al. 
(2014). In their gossip condition, each participant had the information about all other 
members of the group, selected one member about whom to write a gossip note, and the note 
was given to all players of the game in which this target player was to play in the next round. 
In essence, Feinberg et al.’s gossip was broadcast to all members of the gossip target’s group. 
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In contrast, gossip in our studies was interpersonally communicated to only one person in the 
group at a time.  
In this regard, our studies are closest to Sommerfeld et al.’s (2007) and Ahn, Esarey, 
and Scholz’s (2009) experimental paradigms. However, in Sommerfeld et al.’s experiments, 
participants did not play public goods game, but played a dyadic indirect reciprocity game in 
which a participant was paired with two other players, and decided whether or not to give 
some money. If one is said to have given more money to others, one is likely to receive more 
money from others. This game does not present the stark social dilemma of contributing to 
the public goods at one’s own cost. As well, one’s reputation is likely to be directly linked to 
the amount of money one receives because the giving is directed towards a particular 
individual in this experiment.  
Ahn et al.’s local information condition is potentially closer to our experimental 
condition; their participants were allowed to seek reputational information about another 
player from other players when they chose their interaction partners in two-person prisoners’ 
dilemma games. They found an elevated level of cooperation in this condition compared to 
the control. Even this condition, however, diverges significantly from the norm talk 
conditions in the current paradigm in that participants played a dyadic game rather than a 
public goods game within a group, and more importantly, they could select their partners 
based on the reputational information. In this sense, Ahn et al.’s experimental condition 
resembled Feinberg et al.’s (2014) gossip with ostracism condition, where participants who 
received gossip had a chance to ostracize a player with whom they did not wish to play the 
game. By choosing an interaction partner as in Ahn et al. or excluding a player from the game 
as in Feinberg et al.’s gossip with ostracism condition, these experiments allowed participants 
to make an individually targeted partner choice decision; the possibility for partner choice is a 
significant factor that is known to increase cooperation in and of itself (e.g., Rand et al., 
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2009). In contrast, interpersonal norm talk in our experiments was the only factor that 
differed from the control conditions. 
 
Conclusion 
 When prevailing behaviors (i.e., descriptively normative behaviors) are undesirable 
from a moral or practical viewpoint, injunctive norms can play a significant role in socially 
down regulating those behaviors (e.g., Cialdini et al., 2006; Schultz et al., 2007). Whereas 
descriptive norms may be learnable by observing others’ behaviors in the immediate setting 
(e.g., Cialdini et al., 1990) or in social networks (e.g., Kashima, Wilson, Lusher, Pearson, & 
Pearson, 2013), injunctive norms often have to be learned and made salient by language-
based communications (e.g., Lapinski & Rimal, 2005). The present research has shown that 
such language-based interpersonal communications – norm talk – can help resolve social 
dilemmas by sustaining cooperation in the provision of public goods. Although it is often 
assumed that injunctive norms may regulate social behaviors only when accompanied by the 
threat of sanctions (e.g., Bendor & Swistak, 2001), norm talk can arrest the declining level of 
cooperation at least in the short-term through the verification of the norms of cooperation and 
promise keeping, but also through the reminder of potential reputational damage or status 
conferral in the case of gossip.  
 The present results suggest that communicative regulation of collective action in 
social dilemmas is possible, but also that normative communication may need to be 
ritualized. That is to say, the injunctive norm of cooperation may need to be communicated 
and made salient periodically with relatively short intervals. As Rossano (2012) noted, rituals 
may be a critical mechanism by which social norms are communicated and maintained. In 
many large-scale societies, low intensity rituals (i.e., rituals that do not involve severe 
physical pain and high levels of physiological arousal) are performed frequently (Atkinson & 
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Whitehouse, 2011; Collins, 2004). Frequent ritualized norm talk (e.g., Sunday sermons, 
conversations around the water cooler, Facebook comments) may be a significant cultural 
artifact that helps sustain cooperation. Whether this mechanism works under all 
circumstances is an open question, however. In the present experiments, the level of benefit 
that individuals receive from the provision of public goods was set at a moderate level (i.e., 
MPCR = .3 or .4), but not extremely low. It is quite possible that norm talk cannot sustain 
cooperation at much lower levels of MPCR (e.g., .1 or .2). Likewise, if MPCR is much 
higher, norm talk may not need to be repeated as often or may not be even necessary. Future 
research may further investigate the interaction of incentive structure and cultural processes 
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